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Abstract 
 
The emergence of FinTech has drawn the attention of regulators across the globe. Many initiatives 
have been taken by governments to attract new financial innovators and regulate them appropriately to 
prevent regulatory burdens that would discourage the industry. How these governments approach the 
matter differs between countries; the UK seems to be on the forefront of modern regulation. The 
ongoing debate about whether interest groups are able to influence policy and through which 
mechanisms, and how governments approach the regulation of financial innovations will be addressed. 
Thus far, research on FinTech and how to regulate the industry has been very scarce. This thesis takes 
on the topic of FinTech regulation in two ways: first, it will explain that the industry is able to 
influence regulation because of its advantage of having expert knowledge on their own, often 
complicated, technological innovations in finance. Second, the regulatory approach chosen by both the 
Dutch and the UK regulator seems principle-based and very welcoming towards FinTech. This can be 
explained from the position of the governments, which wanted to enhance competition in the financial 
market after the Great Financial Crisis. Principle-based regulation can be seen as a regulatory trend 
which is more often used when dealing with rapid changing innovative industries. Further the 
argument can be made that governments choose this approach because of the simple fact they like to 
attract business to their country. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial Technology (FinTech) has seen tremendous growth over the past decade, trying to 
disrupt the financial services industry (Meola, 14-12-2016). Although the size of the industry 
does not come close to that of the traditional financial industry, FinTech is making its move to 
try and change the game of banking. Innovation is key for these new entrants. New, mostly 
digital, financial products seek to innovate the market for consumers. These new products are 
a challenge for financial regulators.  When constant, complex and disruptive technological 
innovations are happening, knowing what, when and how to structure regulations is difficult 
(Vermeulen, Fenwick & Kaal 2016: 2). Because of quick innovation and a knowledge gap 
between regulator and regulatee, regulators are always one step behind.  
Examples of financial products, which emerged in the last decade, are peer-to-peer 
lending, E-wallets, mobile banking services and more. The emergence of FinTech has led to 
challenges for the financial regulators, but also the FinTech industry feels the challenge of 
being heavily regulated as part of the financial services industry (Barriers to FinTech, 2016). 
Rule-based regulatory regimes can be tough to deal with for young FinTech companies who 
have technical knowledge but limited experience in banking (Arner et al., 2015: 31). How 
regulators approach this industry can affect their growth potential and enhance effective 
competition leading to the possibility of FinTech companies being able to disrupt a heavily 
saturated market dominated by a few large players.  
In 2014, 12 billion dollars poured into FinTech (Mackenzie, 2015). Banks and 
financial service providers are assumed to be the toughest institutions to take on, but investors 
in the new wave of financial start-ups however believes technology can make inroads into the 
complex, heavily regulated and very conservative industry. Within Europe the UK accounts 
for 42 percent of the total funding received in 2014, the Netherlands accounts for 21 percent 
(of which 82 percent for Adyen. Laplanche, CEO of LendersClub, claims that FinTech is the 
first innovation within the financial industry that is not about taking more risk or finding 
loopholes in regulation but about lowering costs for consumers. Why banks were unable to 
fill this gap is explained by the regulatory issues they have, compliance, their huge size and 
sheer cost. When it comes to volume, FinTech is only a small drop within the total of the 
financial industry. But the FinTech industry is infiltrating into areas which traditional banks 
have always found particularly lucrative (Mackenzie, 2015). 
A general assumption is that the ‘traditional’ financial industry has a large influence 
on rules and regulations. Some academics claim influencing policy has become more of an 
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uphill battle after the Great Financial Crisis (hereafter: GFC)(Young, 2013). Regarding 
FinTech, as we will see in this research, regulators are very approachable and responsive 
towards the industry. Stakeholder events, accelerator projects and formal and informal 
meetings with the industry are very common these days. The reason for this is twofold; first to 
enhance competition because the market has been dominated by a few large players and 
second because of the complexity of these new products, regulators need to learn from the 
industry to create appropriate rules and regulations.  
The financial industry has a very large influence on our economy and thereby our 
society. We have seen in the past that financial institutions failed their responsibility and 
regulators failed to notice this in an early enough stage. Nowadays it’s a popular claim to 
make that FinTech industries will take over the core business of traditional banks, 
predominantly the consumer sector. While some claim FinTech had a negligible effect on 
traditional banking operations like deposits and loans so far (Dubovoy, 2015), According to 
McKinsey’s research, banks could lose 60 percent of their retail profits in the next decade 
(McKinsey, 2015). If this trend holds up, ‘good’ and uniform regulation to deal with this rapid 
growing industry.  
Besides the importance for the consumer, the industry itself is in need of proper 
regulation to avoid major obstacles in entering the market. An environment needs to be 
created for start-ups in the industry to be able to grow and be innovative without a large 
regulatory burden, also that The Netherlands is able to compete internationally as a centre for 
start-ups in the industry to attract business.  
Academics have been debating the influence industries have on rules and regulations 
for a long time. Some claim industries have a substantial influence on policy making, others 
claiming the ability to influence is overdone or became more of a challenge after the GFC 
(Young, 2013; Igan et al., 2011). In literature on regulation and in practice, a trend can be 
spotted that regulation shifts from rule-based regulation to more flexible forms of regulation 
like principle-based regulation (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). In order to evaluate whether these 
theories hold for the FinTech industry, this research tries to answer the following question: To 
what extent is the FinTech industry able to influence financial regulation and how do the 
regulators respond to the emergence of new innovative financial products after the great 
financial crisis in The United Kingdom and the Netherlands?  
This question came to mind because the new business models of FinTech do not fit 
well into traditional regulation, which leads to challenges for the regulators in The 
Netherlands and The UK. Is there for instance room for interpretation of the law if a business 
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model doesn’t fit perfectly into existing regulation? Does the regulator responds and listen to 
the industry when the latter is unable to comply with regulation? 
Interest groups and how they influence policy has received much attention in research 
done by scholars. However, as this thesis will explain in the theoretical part, most of this 
research has focused on lobbying politicians in the US and lobbying the European Union. 
There exists a lack of research on lobbying bureaucrats and even less, or close to none, about 
FinTech in general and the new industry’s influence on regulation. This research tries to fill 
this gap by evaluating current regulation of FinTech in the UK and the Netherlands and 
explain the relationship between the regulator and the regulatee. This thesis can therefore 
contribute to literature on the regulatory approach of regulators to FinTech as well as the 
debate on whether financial institutions are able to influence policy.  
Financial institutions have always had a major influence on consumers and the 
economy in general. This relationship was highlighted during the last GFC. The goal of 
financial institutions is twofold: making profits for their own gain and creating a stable and 
sustainable financial environment. Regulating the financial industry properly benefits our 
society. As we have seen in previous crises, a lack of regulatory scrutiny can have devastating 
effects. In the future, as FinTech grows, the industry can play an important role within the 
financial industry and therefore our society. These facts highlight the importance of avoiding 
the regulator to be captured by the industry as well as ‘good’ regulation that needs to be in 
place for the industry to gain stable and sustainable growth.  
The empirical evidence will be analyzed along the ongoing debates about stakeholder 
influence, regulatory approach and financial regulation after the GFC. Lobbying tools are 
assumed to be affected after the GFC, lobbying has become more of an uphill battle (Young, 
2012). This thesis raises the question whether this is the case for FinTech as well. A specific 
advantage the FinTech industry has is its knowledge. Their technological innovations are hard 
to understand for regulators. This gives the industry an advantage in influencing policy 
because they can trade expert information for influence in the policymaking arena (Bouwen, 
2002).  
Omarova (2010) opts for industry wide self-regulation in the financial industry, which 
is at the extreme of the scale. Lodge & Wegrich (2012) explain many alternatives in between 
classical regulation and self-regulation. These regulatory styles are useful to analyze trends in 
the regulation of FinTech to see whether a shift occurs from classical, rule-based regulation 
towards principle-based regulation.  
This thesis is a comparative study of regulation in the UK and the Netherlands. To 
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answer the questions raised in the previous section six interviews have been conducted with 
stakeholders from the industry in the Netherlands and the UK. The UK regulator was 
unwilling to cooperate due to a lack of manpower. They have supplied me with several 
documents and links to their website which held useful information on their vision and 
approach on regulating FinTech. Regarding the Dutch FinTech market interviews have been 
conducted with Funding Circle (peer-to-peer lender), Jungo (crowd mortgage lender) and 
Adyen (payment service provider). For the UK market interviews were conducted with 
Ratesetter (peer-to-peer lender) and Funding Circle. Funding Circle is active in multiple 
countries and deals with regulation in both countries separately. Among the interviewees were 
heads of compliance, founders and managing directors. These interviews in combination with 
policy documents, scientific articles and other documents form the basis for answering the 
research question.  
This thesis will argue that there exists a strong relationship between the FinTech 
industry and financial regulators through which the industry is able to influence policy to 
some extent, and the regulator is able to learn from the new technologies. Thus, stakeholder 
influence for this particular industry doesn’t seem on its return after the GFC. The explanation 
for their relationship is threefold: first of all, regulators want to enhance competition within 
the financial industry by welcoming more companies to the field. Second, because of rapid 
innovations in the industry, the regulator is always one step behind and needs to learn from 
the industry. Third, the FinTech industry is in need of proportionate regulation to avoid a 
regulatory burden and therefore uses the tools to influence regulation.  
Further this research argues that regulators tend to approach the regulation of FinTech 
more principle-based than rule-based. This can especially be seen in the UK where many 
initiatives have been started by the FCA which gives FinTech’s the possibility to road test 
their ideas in a flexible legal framework. The Dutch regulator watches the FCA with a close 
eye and has copied some of their initiatives leading to a more principle-based regulatory 
regime. 
Defining FinTech 
To get the reader acquainted with the concept early on, FinTech will be defined as followed: 
‘FinTech is shorthand for ‘innovation in financial services’, whether that means new products 
from new start-ups, or the adoption of new approaches by existing players where technology 
is the key enabler’ (KPMG, 2016). For the purposes of this research we will focus on new 
entrants into the financial industry. We will not look at the regulation on traditional banks that 
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adopted new approaches. I will focus on the whole of the industry, not just a single type of 
FinTech, for example: peer-to-peer lending platforms, asset management, crowd funding, 
crypto currencies etcetera.  
The traditional financial sector will be defined as banks, which offer a large range of 
products and services and are well established within the industry. The major difference is 
that they arose pre-digitalization, they offer multiple products instead of one (which most 
FinTech companies do) and they don’t specifically focus on digital and online innovation. 
The FinTech sector has many different types of companies, the most popular are P2P 
lending, E-wallets, Bitcoins, mPOS acquiring, T-commerce, M-wallets (mobile banking), etc. 
Because of the quick changes in financial technology, banks have to try and keep up 
improving their, for instance, lending structures to clients. FinTech start-ups can therefore be 
seen as a serious threat to traditional banks (Kalmykova and Ryabova, 2016).  
P2P lending is granting loans between two natural persons without and intermediary 
bank of credit agency, through a website. Kalmykova and Ryabova explain risk is higher for 
peer-to-peer lenders because it’s impossible to check the creditors credit history 
(Kalmykova and Ryabova, 2016). Founder of such a peer-to-peer lending platform, Renaud 
Laplanche claimed the following on the first day of trading of his FinTech: ‘’We think we 
have an opportunity to transform the entire banking system.” This seems to be a giant claim 
of this start-up. We have the opportunity to make finance more cost efficient, consumer 
friendly and transparent. All of the things banks have ceased to be” (Mackenzie, 2015). 
E-wallets (electroninc wallets) are used for making online payments, most commonly 
used for online shopping. It’s a type of prepaid account which can be charged by a connected 
bank account or creditcard (Definition of E-wallets) Pay-Pal, is the biggest example of an 
international online money-transfer system. 
Bitcoins are a type of crypto currency, used between people/companies online to do 
transactions without any intermediary banks or other agencies. For this reason, bitcoins have 
become a real threat to native currencies.   
The mobile point of sale terminals (mPOS gained popularity for use in stores. 
Customers can do purchases wireless in shops with their debit or creditcard. These terminals 
can be connected to a smartphone or tablet and provides businesses with the opportunity to 
enhance their profitability (Kalmykova  and Ryabova, 2016). Adyen is an example of a 
company that delivers these machines, next to being one of the largest payment-service 
providers in the world.   
Furthermore, mobile banking has become more popular, especially for the new 
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customer generation (Kalmykova  and Ryabova, 2016). Traditional banks use this service but 
there are also new banks on the rise which only offer online banking services and don’t use 
physical offices anymore (Simple, Moven, KNAB). 
The rest of the thesis will discuss the following: first a description of all relevant 
stakeholders, then a literature review to put the issue in a relevant theoretical framework. 
After that a description of the empirical evidence gathered through interviews and researching 
articles and documents. These chapters are followed by an analysis where theory is connected 
to the two cases and finally the conclusion from the research. 
 
Most important stakeholders 
In order to establish a proper overview of the industry, all stakeholders in the Netherlands and 
the UK and their role within the financial industry will be mapped. Financial authorities, 
industry interest groups, the FinTech industry, traditional financial industry and consumers all 
have a role, or are at least affected by the way the financial industry is regulated.  
The prudential regulation authorities are respectively the Bank of England (hereafter 
BOE) and De Nederlandsche Bank (hereafter: DNB). BOE’s main objective is to: ‘’promote 
the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates’’ and a secondary objective is to facilitate 
effective competition (Bank of England, 2016). DNB’s main objective is in line with BOE’s: 
creating financial stability and sustainable welfare (De Nederlandse Bank, 2016). If a FinTech 
falls under the jurisdiction of a central bank, this means they will be regulated in terms of 
capital requirements. In order to obtain a banking license, the company in question will be 
severely checked. 
Behavioral regulation is the responsibility of the Financial Conduct Authority 
(hereafter: FCA) and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten (hereafter: AFM).  FCA’s main 
objective is to protect consumers at an appropriate degree and enhance market intergrity 
(Financial Conduct Authority, 2016). The AFM’s main mission is to ensure that financial 
markets are honest and transparent. As an independent supervisory authority they contribute 
to sustainable welfare in the Netherlands (Autoriteit Financiele Markten, 2016). In 
comparison with the prudential authorities, focus of conduct authorities lies with behavior. 
They try to judge whether financial institutions operate fairly and transparent towards 
consumers.  
Probably the most important stakeholder is the industry itself. London is repeatedly 
called the main hub for FinTech innovation. Amsterdam is a lot smaller in volume but still, 
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after London one of the biggest hubs in Europe. Some examples of Dutch FinTech’s are 
Adyen, Bunq, KNAB and Ohpen. Varying from payment-service providers to mobile banking 
to banking software in the cloud. Examples in the UK are Funding-circle, Transferwise, 
Blockchain and Worldremit. Ranging from international payments to peer-to-peer small 
business loans.  
Another stakeholder, which is affected by the FinTech industry and is influenced by 
the way the industry is regulated, is the traditional financial industry as defined in the 
introduction. They could benefit from new technologies coming from the innovative industry 
but can also experience problems if regulation is less strict for FinTech, leading to unfair 
competition. The regulatory burden within the financial industry as a whole is quite large 
because of the responsibility financial institutions has towards the public and our economy.  
In the Netherlands, trade organization Holland FinTech fights for the interests of the 
industry. They conduct research on the industry and regulation, they organize stakeholder 
events and they lobby with the DNB and AFM. In The UK there is not such a general 
stakeholder group, but for a specific industry within FinTech, the peer-to-peer lenders there 
exists a trade organization. They lobby together for changes in regulation and applied at the 
same time for full authorization with the FCA. 
In the next chapter an overview of the current debates in literature regarding lobbying 
in the US and Europe, lobbying in connection to the GFC, types of regulatory approaches, 
regulation of the financial industry and the rise of FinTech and how they are regulated will be 
portrayed. This chapter aims to provide a complete picture on research that supports this 
thesis’ research question. 
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2. Literature review 
 
This chapter will introduce the existing debates on lobbying, stakeholder influence and 
regulatory styles. We will review general literature on lobbying; the debate around financial 
regulation, and finally the literature on FinTech itself. There is an extensive literature on 
lobbying and regulatory influence in the broad sense; however, as we will see, it has limited 
applicability to the case of FinTech.  The debate on financial regulation informs debates about 
how to regulate FinTech, but this new sector is in many cases different form traditional 
finance.  As shown in the discussion below, opinions on types of regulation, and how the 
regulation should be applied, vary strongly. The same counts for theories on stakeholder 
influence.  
There are two related debates regarding the research question. First, more broadly, 
scholars disagree on how and if interest groups are able to influence regulation in practice; 
while one group of scholars argues the financial industry has hardly any influence at all on 
regulation, others believes that the industry successfully inserts its own preferences into 
regulation (Young, 2013; Igan et al., 2011). Further, on the topic of influence of interest 
groups, the assumption of the research by Potters & Sloof (1996) is that the size of 
membership of an interest group influences their power. They also explain there exists a 
relationship between the public knowledge of an issue and the group’s attempt to influence 
government. Bouwen (2002) describes lobbying as an exchange of ‘goods’ where ‘expert’ 
knowledge can be used by the industry to gain influence. Potters and Van Winden (1991) add 
that there’s only ‘’scope for informational lobbying when there exists sufficient congruence in 
the preferences of players’’. 
 Second, analysts disagree on how policymakers should approach the regulation of a 
‘new’ technology such as FinTech and which regulatory style is the most appropriate; ‘a wait 
and see approach’, co-regulation, self-regulation or strict command and control type of 
regulation (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012; Arner et al., 2015; Vermeulen et al., 2016).  Omarova 
(2010) even advises in her research to opt for industry wide self-regulation. This system 
should: ‘’impose the responsibility of protecting the public from future crises directly on the 
financial services industry’’ (Omarova, 2010).  
Both of these debates have taken place against the backdrop of the Great Financial 
Crisis (hereafter GFC). FinTech and its regulation seem to have nothing to do with the recent 
financial crisis, but actually the two are very much connected. The industry was able to grow 
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this quick partially by a lowering trust among consumers in ‘traditional’ financial institutions 
and the motive of regulators to promote more competition after the GFC. Ineffective 
regulation might have led to the crisis. Proponents of greater regulation point out that one of 
the main reasons for the GFC was deficiencies in financial regulation and supervision 
(Fratzscher et al, 2016). According to Arner et al., the rapid growth of FinTech has attracted 
greater regulatory scrutiny, which is warranted given the fundamental role FinTech plays in 
the contemporary economy (Arner et al., 2015 Not surprisingly, the role of regulation in 
preventing such crises and FinTech, which has seen tremendous growth in the last ten years, 
have been central to these debates.  
 
Lobbying and Regulatory Influence in the US and Europe 
This part offers an overview of academic literature on lobbying politicians in the US, 
lobbying bureaucrats and politicians at the EU level, lobbying in the financial industry and the 
relationship between lobbying and the recent GFC. These theories can offer guidance in 
analyzing the gathered empirical evidence and show the importance of the relationship 
between regulator and regulatee. 
To offer some context, Igan et al. describe lobbying as follows: ‘’Lobbying is broadly 
defined as a legal activity aiming at changing existing rules or policies or procuring individual 
benefits. Private benefits could materialize in the form of preferential access to credit, bailout 
guarantees, privileged access to licenses, or procurement contracts’’ (Igan et al., 2011: 7). To 
highlight the presence and importance of lobbying to influence the creation of public policy, 
Potters and Sloof say that: ‘’It can almost be considered a truism, that interest groups play an 
important role in the formation of public policy’’ (Potters & Sloof, 1996: 404). A lot of 
research has been conducted (dating back to the fifties) assessing the importance of interest 
groups in the formation of public policy where interest groups were placed at the heart of the 
political process (Potters & Sloof, 1996: 404). In most research the impact of interest groups 
on the democratic quality of government is portrayed negatively.  
 Potters & Sloof present at the end of their literature review on interest groups what 
they call ‘stylized facts’ about the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes: 
- ‘’Campaign contributions and lobbying alter a legislator’s (voting) behavior, 
particularly, with respect to bills with a narrow focus and low public visibility.’’ 
	 12	
- ‘’The strategy of ideological groups is oriented towards supporting like-minded 
legislators; corporate groups are more aimed to change legislators’ positions; labor 
groups employ an intermediate strategy.’’ 
- ‘’The larger the organized membership of an interest group, the larger its political 
influence will be.’’ 
- ‘’A group’s stake in influencing public policy is a positive determinant of both its 
political activity and its success.’’ 
- ‘’The relation between the number of potential participants of collective action and 
influence on policy outcomes is an intricate one, driven by both free-riding effects and 
effects on the group’s (electoral) resources. The same holds for measures of 
concentration.’’ 
- ‘’The presence of an oppositional (coalitional) force in the political arena hurts (helps) 
a group’s case in politics.’’ 
- ‘’Strong electoral pressures on the polity and the presence of a well-informed 
electorate, lower the influence of special interest groups.’’ (Potters & Sloof, 1996: 
433). 
Most of these observations are not applicable to our case, either because they are particular to 
the US, such as those regarding campaign finance, or because they focus primarily on ways of 
influencing elected representatives rather than bureaucrats. There are also a few important 
differences between the case of influencing politicians in the United States and the case of 
Dutch and UK FinTech companies being able to influence policy (or not). First, this research 
has focused mostly on campaign contributions, which is very uncommon or even non-existing 
in the UK and the Netherlands. Second, this thesis is about regulation, often created by 
bureaucrats, not politicians. So the actors that need to be influenced differ. However, several 
of the ‘stylized facts’ mentioned above are useful for the case of influencing FinTech 
regulation: the relationship between the size of membership and its influence, and the 
relationship between the public’s knowledge of the issues and the group’s attempt to 
influence the government. The power of the traditional financial industry is often explained 
by its size. FinTech is still a fraction of the size of the traditional financial industry, 
suggesting that it would have little influence over regulators. However, as we will see, 
FinTech companies have an advantage in knowledge. Knowledge is considered as one of the 
most important ‘goods’ industries have to influence policy, because the regulator is interested 
in gaining industries’ knowledge. 
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 While there is extensive literature on lobbying and the influence of interest groups in 
the United States, it is harder to find literature on the topic in Europe. More recently, scholars 
have taken interest in research on lobbying and interest groups in trying to influence policy 
makers and legislators at the European Union level (Bennett, 1997; Greenwood et al., 1992; 
Bouwen, 2002; Jarman, 2010; Kluver et al., 2015). According to Bouwen, (2002: 365):  ‘’One 
of the major lessons that can be drawn from this literature is the diversity and complexity of 
European Union lobbying, which make reliable generalizations very difficult’’.  
 European integration created new regulatory institutions. With the legislative powers 
of the European parliament limited, bureaucratic institutions often become the most important 
target of influence groups.  Bouwen (2002) argues that: ‘’it’s a challenge to develop 
theoretical ideas in the field of European interest politics’’. He builds a new theoretical 
framework about the access of business interest to European institutions, based on exploratory 
data in the EU financial sector. The key to understanding lobbying activities for business 
interest in the EU is the relationship between two interdependent organizations. The 
relationship between the lobbying group and regulatory institution is not unidirectional; rather 
there is an exchange of goods (Bouwen, 2002). 
Bouwen made a division between three different types of access goods for business to 
use to gain access to the policy shaping domain: ‘expert knowledge’, ‘information about the 
European encompassing interest’ and ‘information about the domestic encompassing interest’. 
The importance of ‘expert knowledge’ in the EU decision-making process has been widely 
acknowledged; the last two access goods have not been previously identified (Bouwen, 2002: 
369-370). Encompassing interest means the aggregation of interests, for example through a 
trade organization or union. This can take place at the domestic as well as the EU level. 
Access can only be gained to an institution if the ‘goods’ are being demanded (Bouwen, 2002: 
372-373).  
Another scholar who focuses more specifically on informational lobbying is Potters & 
Van Winden (1991). They describe informational lobbying as: ‘’the use by interest groups of 
their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in 
an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies’’. They regard this type of use of 
information as an important means of influence (Potters & Van Winden, 1991). Their 
research shows that lobbying messages from an interest group to a policy maker may be 
informative, even if there is a substantial conflict of interest. They explain that there is scope 
for informational lobbying under the circumstance that there is: ‘’sufficient congruence in the 
preferences of the players’’ (Potters & Van Winden, 1991). 
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In this thesis the main actors that can possibly be influenced are bureaucrats from the 
AFM and FCA. The study of bureaucrats that are being lobbied by businesses is much more 
unusual than politicians. Bureaucratic lobbying is more difficult to observe and explain 
(McKay, 2010: 123). A group survey in Denmark, asking the question for which issues 
business turn to what kind of bodies to influence policy making through (Binderkrantz & 
Kroyer, 2012) found that bureaucrats are more often lobbied for technically complicated goals 
in contrast with groups that mainly lobby for general interests; they often lobby parliament 
and the media. FinTech is a very technical industry and the preferences of both the regulator 
and the industry might be the same in that regulators would like to understand the business 
they are dealing with better and FinTech companies like to understand their regulatory 
obligations.  
 
Lobbying and the Great Financial Crisis 
Much research has been conducted on lobbying and the power the financial institutions in 
relation to the GFC (Johnson, 2009; Young, 2012). The influence that the financial sector has 
over public policy is seen as a major issue (Johnson, 2009). In financial panic, governments 
need to respond with speed and force rather than wishful thinking and a ‘wait and see’ 
approach. The velvet glove approach is deeply troubling because it is inadequate to change 
the behavior of the financial industry. Johnson (2009) further claims that: ‘’Policy changes 
that might have forestalled the crisis but would have limited the financial sector’s profits were 
ignored or swept aside, as the financial industry became even more powerful in the past 25 
years’’. 
Several scholars have argued that the GFC has made it much more difficult for the 
financial sector to influence lobbying. K. Young tries to answer the question whether 
financial sector groups are policy ‘takers’ or policy ‘shapers’ (2013). K. Young argues that 
the ability to influence regulation is more partial and contingent than expected by most, and 
that the lobbying tools of the financial sector have been affected by the recent economic 
crisis, making lobbying more of an uphill battle than before (Young, 2013). The public 
sentiment against financial institutions in the wake of the crisis has led politicians to adopt 
stricter policies regarding regulation, in part because of the fear that voters will punish them if 
they do not. 
The new, post-GFC, focus on regulation has also led some scholars to investigate 
whether there is indeed a link between lobbying and risk-taking. For example, Igan et al., 
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(2011), have tried to understand whether lobbying in the financial sector contributed to the 
recent financial crisis (Igan et al., 2011). They compared whether lobbying lenders behaved 
differently from non-lobbying lenders in the period 2000-2007. They constructed a data set 
combining information on mortgage lending activities and lobbying at the federal level. The 
researchers found a relationship between risk-taking and lobbying in the years 2000 until 
2007, leading to various outcomes, one of them that financial companies who lobby actively 
had higher loan-to-income ratios (Igan et al., 2011). The implication of that research was that 
lobbying by firms needs to be limited if regulators aim to bring more stability into the 
financial system. 
The literature on the relation between lobbying, risk-taking and the crisis show the 
importance of the balance of power between regulator and regulatee. The societal 
responsibility of financial companies is too large to be overlooked. Therefore, regulatory 
capture by the industry could lead to unfavorable outcomes for society.  
Building an effective relationship 
This thesis looks not only at lobbying in the narrow sense of groups influencing lawmakers, 
but a much broader ‘relationship’ between the industry and rule-setters. Next to lobbying, 
companies can influence policy making by being invited to consult on regulation by 
regulators or share their thoughts on regulation through stakeholder events. Influencing rules 
and regulation can happen through a mechanism where companies pay campaign 
contributions (‘traditional’ form of lobbying) to get access to the policy arena but also by 
using ‘expert knowledge’ as a tradable good.  
Norman Champ focuses on the importance for business to establish a proper 
relationship with the regulator: ‘‘each business, no matter what the industry, must decide what 
strategy it is going to pursue with regulators’’ (Champ, 2015). Champ proposes that 
businesses ‘’follow a strategy of constructive engagement with the regulator in the industry’’. 
Strategies of avoidance or opposition with the regulator are highly ineffective, ‘’constructive 
engagement is the only viable choice for a business seeking an effective relationship with its 
regulator’’ (Champ, 2015). From his experience in his time working with the SEC, Champ 
identifies about four periods in the relationship between regulator and regulatee to engage and 
how: 
- ‘When things are quiet’ (as a company, offer your assistance. For example on 
developments in your specific financial industry) 
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- ‘During a rulemaking’ (consulting the SEC during a rulemaking could lead to valuable 
insides on the effects of a new rule on the industry and change rules possibly in favor 
of the industry) 
- ‘During an examination’ (during this time you have the opportunity as a firm to 
present your firm in the best light and to address any questions the examiners have) 
- ‘During an investigation’ (recommended is a spirit of cooperation and continue to 
explain the facts that landed you in the investigation) (Champ, 2015) 
He further explains that when there is an issue with the regulator, it is far better if the SEC 
already knows you and your compliance program. The chances of fixing the issue become 
much higher than when your company is completely unknown to the SEC. Champ stretches 
the importance for companies of a ‘good’ relationship with the financial regulator, this 
relationship can help when there are disputes or new regulations which do not suit the 
companies’ business model (Champ, 2015). 
The literature described above offers some useful paradigms in the case of FinTech, 
the size and organization of membership of an interest group and the relationship between the 
public’s knowledge and attempts to influence affect the possibility of influencing policy 
making. The observation that lobbying can be seen as an exchange of goods is also applicable 
to the study of how industries try to influence regulators. After the GFC lobbying tools were 
affected and lobbying became more of an uphill battle than before, in part because cause 
lobbying led to more risk taking and this led eventually to the financial crisis. Finally,existing 
studies have shown that when the industry supplies ‘expert’ knowledge and it gains influence 
on policy making in return.  As we will see this is particularly important in the case of 
FinTech.  
Types of Regulation  
Scholars have identified several regulatory approaches that run a spectrum from classical 
regulation (rules-based and written with minimal input from industry) to market regulation, in 
which market signals rather than any specialized body play the most important role. Classical 
regulation is nowadays seen as outdated because of its inflexibility, but remains popular 
because of its clear rules and limited room for interpretation.  
The term “regulation” actually encompasses a range of regulatory behavior with 
varying degree of participation by sector actors. M. Lodge & K. Wegrich make a division 
between various types of regulatory styles, in particular classical regulation (and variants to 
classical regulation), self-regulation and market based alternatives (2012). Classical 
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regulation is often described as a ‘command and control’ approach, with clear fixed standards, 
backed by criminal sanctions. The law is used to set demands, prohibitions or conditions for 
particular activities to take place with minimal input from the industry. Should there be an 
infringement of the rules, the aggrieved party is able to seek legal redress and receive 
compensation. This type of approach to regulation reduces uncertainty by setting a standard 
that is applicable to all (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 96-100). 
Co-regulation is a form of self-regulation, just as: professional self-regulation, 
industry self-regulation. The idea is that the state deliberately chooses to rely on a close 
connection between regulator and regulatee to deliver public goals (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 
102). Co-regulation is particularly interesting for my research, while co-regulation is rarely 
discussed in existing theories on lobbying, as a framework it better helps explain the 
cooperation between regulatory agencies and the industry and thereby explain and measure 
influence of them on ‘shaping’ policy. Co-regulatory regimes are characterized by an 
intermeshing of non-state and state authority. It is recommended that such co-regulatory 
regimes should include public interest groups also. Co-regulation can be defined as ‘’an 
explicitly specific non-state regulatory regime set up as part of a (inter)-governmental 
strategy’’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 105). In short, ‘’they are directly linked to public policy 
goals and are supported by state-based legal frameworks’’; discretionary powers of the state 
shift towards the industry (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 105-106). 
Another alternative to classical regulation is a market-based approach. This alternative 
relies on market mechanisms and economic incentives. By appealing to individual and 
organization self-interest the achievement of regulatory goals does not require reliance on 
formal regulatory regimes. Lodge & Wegrich (2012) explain that: ‘’Market-based incentives 
are said to allow for flexibility and efficiency, while encouraging organizational innovation. 
Incentives are said to allow organizations to go beyond minimum levels of compliance’’.  
As discussed earlier, influencing regulations by companies might lead to the negative 
effect that only the interests of the companies are being served instead of the supposed 
societal interests. In their turn regulation could be ineffective and cause a possible crisis. For 
this reason Omarova (2010) proposes a way to prevent future crises; industry wide self-
regulation. This system should: ‘’impose the responsibility of protecting the public from 
future crises directly on the financial services industry’’ (Omarova, 2010). Currently the 
financial industry lacks incentives to create such regulatory system, although self-regulation 
has proven to work in other industries. This article argues that it’s possible to alter the 
existing incentive structure through thoughtful regulatory design (Omarova, 2010). 
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Regulating the Financial Industry  
The debate on financial regulation in general exploded after the great financial crisis (GFC). 
Scholars addressed the topic to determine how to prevent future crises by regulating the 
industry effectively (Admati & Hellwig, 2014; Congdon & others, 2009).  In the past decades 
many financial reform policies were implemented. The aim of these policies is to: ‘’enhance 
competition, improve resource allocation and build more efficient financial institutions by 
making them less state-directed. Ultimately these policies should contribute to economic 
growth’’ (Hermes & Meester, 2015: 2154). Because of the importance of economic growth, 
financial reforms have been heavily promoted by international organizations. So far, no 
consensus has been reached about whether these reforms improve the efficiency of banks 
(Hermes & Meester, 2015: 2154).  
Further, scholars debate the pros and cons of financial liberalization. On the one hand 
liberalization might strengthen price mechanism and improve the conditions for market 
competition. On the other hand, more competition may lead to reduced profit margins and can 
increase financial fragility (Hellman et al, 2000). Reforms like liberalization may even trigger 
banking crises if they lead to excessive risk-taking (Hermes and Meester, 2015: 2155). 
 After the GFC bank regulatory regimes were tightened worldwide to strengthen 
banking stability and resilience. Opponents of the new regulatory regime have claimed that 
they are undesirable because they lead to a lower loan supply by banks, slowing economic 
recovery and growth. (Fratzscher et al, 2016: 113). Proponents of greater regulation point out 
that one of the main reasons for the GFC was deficiencies in financial regulation and 
supervision (Fratzscher et al, 2016: 114). Proper regulation in the industry is needed to protect 
consumers and the market from failing financial institutions, which can cause major damage 
like the GFC. 
The rise of FinTech and regulation 
The rapid growth of FinTech has according to Arnet et al.,: ‘’attracted greater regulatory 
scrutiny, which is warranted given the fundamental role FinTech plays in the contemporary 
economy’’ (Arner et al., 2015: 3). The connection between technology and finance exists for 
a long time. This paper explains that FinTech can be divided into three phases (1.0, 2.0, 3.0), 
starting with the laying of the Atlantic cable in 1866, the Automatic Teller Machine in 1967 
and the period after GFC when new entrants entered the market with innovate financial 
products based on IT. The use of IT in financial services is not a recent trend; the financial 
services industry has the prime purchaser of IT since the 1990s. FinTech 3.0 (the period since 
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2008) has been characterized by new start-ups that deliver financial products and services 
directly to businesses and the general public (Arner et al., 2015: 5-6).  
The post-GFC period has seen financial services increasingly provided not just by 
traditional institutions, but rather by companies founded by entrepreneurs from the technology 
world rather than banking (Arner et al, 2015: 15). In fact, post-GFC regulation of more 
traditional financial service providers opened up an opportunity for the Fintech newcomers. 
For example, Basel III increased capital requirements, which diverted capital from financial 
institutions and consumers. In order to fulfill their need for credit, consumers may have turned 
towards P2P lending platforms or other alternatives (Arner et al., 2015: 17). These alternative 
funding sources were helped by the ‘perfect storm’; ‘’increased regulatory pressures that 
limited banks’ capacity to innovate, the negative public perception of banks and human talent 
outflow of the traditional financial industry necessary for knowledge within start-ups’’ (Arner 
et al., 2015: 18). 
Relationships between FinTech companies and their regulators haven’t been addressed 
by scholars yet. There does exist some literature on FinTech and regulation, but this is more 
about regulation in general (Douglas, 2016). Thus, debate regarding how regulation actually 
happens is more muddled. New technology players enter a market without an established 
interaction with financial regulators. Arnet et al., (2015) argue that these new entrants: ‘’tend 
to lack a financial compliance culture that identifies prudential or consumer protection when 
delivering financial services’’.  This is not true in all cases, as new entrants that are closer to 
traditional financial industries are more likely to follow their approach to compliance. Thus, 
start-ups close to financial centers like New York, London and Hong Kong tend to have 
stronger compliance cultures than in Silicon Valley where more IT engineers are in control 
than finance professionals (Arner et al., 2015: 31). The lack of regulatory compliance might 
come from technology companies who believe themselves not to be subject to rules and 
regulations or are just not aware of the rules that may apply (Arner et al., 2015: 31).  
One proposed solution is to be found somewhere in the middle, in an approach that 
balances the view of each party (technology industry, financial actors and regulators) (Arner 
et al., 2015: 31). In order for this to happen one needs to understand why certain rules are 
enforced and start-ups need to be educated on their regulatory obligations (Arner et al., 2015: 
31). The key objectives of regulators are: ‘’(1) financial stability, (2) prudential regulation, (3) 
conduct and fairness, and (4) competition and market development’’ (Arner et al., 2015: 31-
32). The question is not only ‘what’ to regulate but also ‘when’ to regulate. Arner et al., 
(2015) explain this process in three steps: ‘’First the market may need to settle before 
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regulatory intervention. Second, the availability alone of a technology does not mean it will 
be widely adopted. Third, there may be a strong benefit in regulatory measures not 
influencing market innovation or technological standards’’ (Arner et al., 2015: 32). 
Regulators need to stay technology-neutral and focus on the potential outcome of a new 
technology, a wait-and-see approach that allows the regulator to learn whether the market will 
adapt to the new technology (Arner et al., 2015: 33). This approach can be the most cost-
effective for regulators as well as the industry (Arner et al., 2015: 33). Most FinTech 
innovations emerge from sand-boxes, incubators or accelerator programs, graduating from 
such programs flags that the company has somewhat matured given the participation in a 
structured curriculum (Arner et al., 2015: 34). A change of attitude towards how FinTech is 
regulated is needed, because the industry is comprised of established players as well as start-
ups, this might proof to be difficult (Arner et al., 2015: 35). 
Start-ups are in need of low-cost regulation, since heavier regulation is incompatible 
with their lean business model: ‘’This group of companies prefers the more flexible 
compliance obligations of a principle-based regulatory regime, more focus is given to the 
spirit of a regulation, rather than ‘box-ticking’’’ (Arner et al., 2015: 36). The rule-based 
regime that creates clear rules and processes is expensive for a start-up because: ‘’every rule 
and process needs to be identified and complied with. ‘’This may consume financial resources 
that could be used otherwise to build their business’’ (Arner et al., 2015: 36).  Regulatory 
obligations should adapt to the phase of which a company is in, thereby being more flexible 
and easy to comply with  (Arner et al., 2015: 37).  
When constant, complex and disruptive technological innovations are happening, 
knowing what, when and how to structure regulations is difficult. Regulators can either 
choose to opt for reckless action or paralysis (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 2). The law and 
regulations often prohibit or limit commercial exploitation and public access to new 
technology. The debate about regulatory constraints has become more pressing since new 
technologies arrive more frequently and at a faster pace nowadays (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 
5). Regulators often struggle to keep up when technology is faster than the law; examples 
from the last two decades are genetically modified food, artificial intelligence and driverless 
cars (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 5). Regulators select facts about a new technology which to 
them seems to be relevant to what, when and how to make a regulatory intervention. The 
‘what’ question is about identifying the technology that must be regulated. Demarcating the 
scope of a technology may not always be self-evident, facts are crucial in this type of 
definitional judgment (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 7). The ‘when’ questions concerns the timing 
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of any regulatory intervention. To avoid regulation to stifle and distort technological 
intervention, it shouldn’t come too soon, but also not too late so that problems can arise from 
the absence of regulation. The ‘how’ question is about the form and substance of the 
regulation. Should the innovation be encouraged, restricted or prohibited in some way? And 
what rules or principles should be adopted to achieve this goal (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 8). 
The task however, to establish facts about a new technology can proof to be difficult by the 
lack of an adequate sample or other reliable data on the effects of new technologies. For some 
facts we simply lack the experience or imagination to predict what negative possibilities may 
be associated with a piece of new technology (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 9). In this respect 
regulation of any disruptive new technology is always going to be reactive and based on an 
uncertain and politicized factual basis (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 9). 
According to Vermeulen and others, lawmaking and regulatory designs need to 
become more proactive, dynamic and responsive (2016: 18). But how can regulators achieve 
this goal? First, they need to follow data driven regulatory interventions. Different sources of 
data surrounding new technologies can provide some signals or clues about what, when and 
how to regulate (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 19). Second, regulators need to follow a principle-
based approach. Some experimentation with regulatory schemes in a comparable setting can 
help to decide which regulations are best suited for an industry. ‘’Regulators need to abandon 
a fixation on finality and legal certainty and embrace contingency, flexibility and openness to 
the new,” argue (Vermeulen et al, 2016: 23-24). Third, Vermeulen and others propose the 
idea of a “regulatory sandbox” to roll out and test new ideas within a safe space without being 
enforced to comply with the applicable set of rules and regulations (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 
25). This regulatory approach is already adopted in the financial industry (FCA, UK), and it is 
only to be expected that this trend will expand to other areas (Vermeulen et al., 2016: 28). 
Scholars have also pointed that regulation is no longer seen as a necessary ‘evil’, but 
as key to attracting investment and facilitating economic and social life. For that reason 
debates among scholars, regulators, and entrepreneurs are mostly about the quality of 
regulation rather than its necessity in principle (Lodge & Wegrich, 2009: 146). A distinction 
can be made be between regulation based on ‘clear rules’ and a reliance on ‘principles’. Rules 
are defined as specific prescriptions, principles are defined as standards that offer broad 
guidance. ‘Rule-based’ standards can be vulnerable; they are only superior under conditions 
of stable and relatively simple environments. Under conditions of higher complexity and 
more rapidly changing environments, rules are arguably highly limited in their benefits and 
even potentially counter-productive. Complex environments are characterized by the presence 
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of corporations, transitional technologies and strategic behaviors. Rules are likely to interact 
with other rules, and attempts to clarify complex laws by even more complexity has a 
redistributive impact. Relying on principles on the other hand is more demanding on 
regulatory subjects, deciding for themselves how to translate broad principles into action. In 
general a principle-based approach is more demanding for both regulator and the regulated 
industry (Lodge & Wegrich, 2009: 60-62). 
 The theoretical debates displayed in the section above fit in this research because first, 
theory is able to explain why the regulator chooses a certain response to this new industry. 
Second, theories on stakeholder influence will be tested to see whether they account for the 
young FinTech industry.  
 The next chapter will explain how the literature review will be used to analyze the 
gathered empirical evidence and further explains the research design. It also explains the 
shortcomings of this thesis as well as it societal and scientific relevance. 
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3. Research methods 
This research tempts to answer the question to what extent the FinTech industry is 
able to influence financial regulation and how the regulators respond to the emergence of new 
innovative financial products after the great financial crisis in The United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands? This question came to mind because the new business models of FinTech don’t 
fit well into traditional regulation. The way they approach the industry in a different manner 
and the knowledge gap between regulator and regulatee leads to challenges for the regulators 
in The Netherlands and The UK. Is there for instance room for interpretation of the law if a 
business model doesn’t fit perfectly into existing regulation? Does the regulator responds and 
listens to the industry when they are unable to comply with regulation? 
The research I am conducting is explanatory as well as deductive; the existing theories 
on influencing policy and different regulatory styles will be tested to see whether the FinTech 
industry is able to influence regulation and how regulators respond to their ideas. The initial 
goal of the research is to see if existing research on stakeholder influence, regulatory styles 
and financial regulation after the GFC fit for the upcoming and small industry of FinTech. 
Thereby generalizing the theory. As we have seen in the literature review, not many scientific 
articles have been written on the topic of FinTech in general. Also the topic of lobbying 
bureaucrats hasn’t got as much attention as lobbying politicians.  For this reason the this 
thesis can add to the discussion on influencing regulators as well as the more general debate 
about how to approach the regulation of FinTech. 
The financial industry has a very large influence on our economy and thereby our 
society. We have seen in the past that financial institutions failed their responsibility and 
regulators failed to notice this in an early enough stage (Admati & Hellwig, 2014; Congdon & 
others, 2009). Some claim FinTech industries will take over the core retail business of 
traditional banks, predominantly the consumer sector (McKinsey, 2015). If this trend would 
be true, ‘good’ and uniform regulation is necessary to avoid crises like we have had in the 
past. Besides the importance for the consumer, the industry is in need of ‘good’ regulation as 
well. We want to create an environment for start-ups in the industry to be able to grow and be 
innovative without a large regulatory burden, also that The Netherlands is able to compete 
internationally as a place for start-ups in the industry.  
 This thesis will engage in several ongoing debates about stakeholder influence, 
regulatory approaches and financial regulation after the GFC.  All of these debates touch the 
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topic of current FinTech regulation and the amount of influence FinTech has in the creation of 
policy.  
 The preferences of the FinTech industry might have an effect on current regulation. 
Through lobbying, consultations and stakeholder events, the industry is possibly able to 
inserts its own preferences into regulation. How the government approaches FinTech 
regulation in a country is influenced by many factors such as regulatory landscape, political 
ideas and the size of the financial industry. In this thesis we will explore whether the GFC had 
an influence on the way government’s approach FinTech.  Further, the more descriptive 
question of how the government approaches FinTech and how the industry feels about the 
regulatory approach will be answered.   
The measurements have taken place by doing interviews with all stakeholders. For this 
thesis six interviews have been conducted and documents have been used about the vision of 
the FCA and Holland FinTech. All interviews have taken place over the phone, have been 
recorded and are available to be checked whenever this is asked. In appendix 2 you will find a 
list of sample questions used for the interviews. The interviewees were invited by a letter, 
which can be found in appendix 1. The interview was semi-structured and divided into two 
sections, both answering a different part of the research question; stakeholder influence and 
regulatory approach. On average, the interviews took about 30 minutes. The following 
stakeholders were interviewed as part of my research:  - Anonymous employee of Autoriteit Financiele Markten (Authority of Financial 
Markets) - Jasper Hoogland, CTO of Jungo (Dutch FinTech) - Dagmar van Ravenswaay Claasen, director regulatory affairs at Adyen (Dutch 
FinTech) - Jeroen Broekema, managing director at Funding Circle (Dutch division of the 
company) - Gerard Hurley, head of compliance at Funding Circle (UK division of the company) - Luke O’Mahony, press officer at Ratesetter (UK FinTech) 
These actors have been selected to do interviews with because the regulatory agencies 
mentioned are responsible for oversight of the sector in their country and the FinTech industry 
is directly affected by their regulation. 
These interviews can provide insight on whether stakeholders are often consulted and 
asked to cooperate with creating or commenting on new regulation. It can also provide insight 
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on how the stakeholders feel about the regulation of the FinTech industry and what trends can 
be spotted regarding how regulators choose to regulate. Either by traditional command and 
control rule-based or via more principle-based regulation.  
The research will be a comparison between the amounts of influence stakeholders have in 
the Netherlands and the UK and how these governments approach the way they regulate. It 
will be a small-N comparison. This research is a qualitative case study, the results will mostly 
come from the interviews and a smaller part from analyzing policy documents.  
The units of analysis in this research are The Netherlands and The UK, more specifically 
regulation of FinTech industry in these two countries. The units of observation are all actors 
described on previously, meaning all stakeholders and the regulatory agencies that will be 
interviewed.  
If the results of this study have potential to be generalized, the relevant population will be 
all countries with a financial centre around the world where FinTech companies operate. But 
mostly this study will be useful for The Netherlands and The UK, to be able to learn from 
each other’s cases.  
The cases were selected because of their diversity. While both the Netherlands and 
London are important financial hubs with vibrant start-up scenes and debates about 
regulation, there are important differences in terms of regulatory culture.  London is seen as 
the centre for FinTech start-ups, and regulatory bodies have more experience with regulating 
the industry. There is a specific trend of cooperative regulation, introduced by the UK 
government to attract business. Amsterdam has, in general, a much smaller financial sector 
but is noticed as a new base for financial start-ups. Regulation on this matter is more 
immature and less developed as in the UK. The expectations of this thesis are that the UK is 
more welcoming to FinTech companies because of their history as a financial hub. They want 
to remain their strong position, in order to do so they need to attract business. This may lead 
to a more ‘light’ touch approach to the regulation of FinTech. Further, because of the different 
sizes of the industries Dutch regulators might be easier to approach, having to deal fit far less 
companies. As for the regulators, they differ in two important aspects: first, the FCA has the 
task to promote effective competition, in the Netherlands this task lies with the ACM. Second, 
they have been given more power to create new regulation. In the Netherlands, the process of 
installing new regulations has to go through the Ministry of Finance.  
Because regulation changes constantly, a threat might be that during my research new 
rules and regulation are installed. This might lead to having to adjust certain parts of my 
thesis in the end. The regulator and industries aren’t the only groups able to influence 
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regulation; political agendas and ideas and the media and public also play a role in how 
regulation is shaped. These influences will be hard to adjust for in this thesis. Therefore the 
main analysis will be measuring how often the industry gets consulted and not only looking at 
how favorable policy is to a certain industry. Also because interviewing is time consuming 
and not every actor is willing to talk, results are limited by not covering the whole industry. 
Therefore the selection has been made so that at least a view sub-industries within the 
FinTech are covered and an interview with the AFM and some policy documentation from the 
FCA to cover both the regulators’ and the industries’ perspective.  
The external validity might prove to be low for my research, there are so many differences 
between countries and how they choose to regulate an industry and if they allow stakeholder 
consultation, that the outcomes will be hard to generalize. 
 In the next chapter the case of the UK FinTech market will be discussed. First some 
background on the regulatory landscape and current regulation and then moving towards the 
empirical evidence on FinTech’s ability to influence regulation and the current regulatory 
approach by the FCA. Most empirical evidence is gathered by doing interviews and reading 
policy documents and reports on FinTech regulation. 
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4. The UK FinTech market and regulation 
 
This section discusses the UK FinTech market and the current regulatory framework. First a 
general description of what the market looks like in the UK followed by a short description of 
the general regulatory framework in the UK to apply some context. Then some background 
and theory on how rapid changing technologies should be regulated in general and an 
overview of the current regulatory initiatives on FinTech. The last and most important part of 
this chapter is the empirical evidence section where both the views of the industry as well as 
the regulator on current regulation and the relationship between regulator and regulatee will 
be discussed. 
Financial regulation is currently faced with a lot of pressures: ‘’political pressures to 
curb excesses, increasing EU regulations, individual firms being simultaneously regulated in 
multiple jurisdictions and with multiple frameworks; institutions being asked to produce 
escalating amounts of financial, risk and compliance data’’ (Ernst and Young, 2014). The 
industry is in need of flexible financial regulation of new global alternative finance entrants 
and importantly, balancing FinTech innovation with regulation (Ernst and Young, 2014). The 
UK Trade and Investment organization claims the UK is becoming ‘the’ destination of choice 
for FinTech companies. The UK FinTech market is (including payments, platforms, software 
and data analytics) worth 20 billion GBP to the UK annually. Since 2008 the value of 
investments in FinTech increased 8 times in the UK to 265 USD in 2013. This makes the UK 
the fastest growing region in this respect (Ernst and Young, 2014). The report emphasized 
that growth was mainly due to: ‘’London’s position as a giant financial center, good 
availability of business capital and a supportive regulatory structure’’ (Ernst and Young, 
2014). I interviewed three companies which operate at the UK FinTech market about current 
regulation of the industry: FundingCircle, Ratesetter and Adyen. Funding Circle and 
Ratesetter are two of the biggest peer-to-peer lending platforms and Adyen one of the biggest 
payments services providers. Further documentation of the FCA has been used on their vision 
on the market and according regulation. 
What does the general regulatory landscape look like in the UK? 
The current regulatory state in the UK developed in the 80’s and 90’s due to a withdrawal 
from the state out of key economic activities, a by-product of the centralizing manner in 
which the policy was carried out (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004: 149). In these years Margaret 
Thatcher led the way in the UK, including the governments Next Steps program: individual 
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agencies were created to ‘’handle distinct governmental activities on behalf of ministries, 
each within a regulatory framework designed to solve principal-agent problems, including 
features such as performance requirements and targets’’ (Lynn, 2006: 118). On the forefront 
of developing new public-private arrangements to facilitate and more efficient delivery of 
public services is the UK.  
The concept of ‘government by contract’ originated in the UK; the government prefers to 
achieve the public interests by contracting with private bodies (Giglioni, 2012: 100-102). 
‘Government by contract’ requires different instruments of accountability than those 
traditionally employed, based on the participation and direct involvement of citizens, 
undertakings and their associations (Giglioni, 2012: 102). What is also typical about the UK 
regulatory regime (also US and some other OECD countries) is the principles of control over 
the imposition of regulatory burdens. They have procedural requirements that rule-makers 
carry out regulatory impact assessments on new regulation  (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004: 
162). These RIA’s are also part of the principles of the ‘Better Regulation Task Force’. In 
1997, this task force devised five principles of ‘Good Regulation’. These principles should be 
able to guide the design and review of regulations in any domain (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 
54).  
The Better Regulation Task Force came up with a policy-makers checklist consisting of 
the following key concepts, which regulators should bear, in mind:  
- ‘’Proportionality: Regulators should only intervene when necessary. Remedies should 
be appropriate to the risk posed, and costs identified and minimized.’’ - ‘’Accountability: Regulators must be able to justify decisions, and be subject to public 
scrutiny. ‘’ - ‘’Consistency: Government rules and standards must be joined up and implemented 
fairly.’’  - ‘’Transparency: Regulators should be open, and keep regulations simple and user-
friendly. ‘’ - ‘’Targeting: Regulation should be focused on the problem, and minimize side 
effects.’’  (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003: 4-6).  
Their goal is to avoid poorly designed or overly complicated regulation, because this 
can impose excessive costs and inhibit productivity: ‘’The job of government is to get the 
balance right, providing proper protection and making sure that the impact on those being 
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regulated is proportionate’’ (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003: 2). These principles tell us 
something on how the UK approaches regulation in general.  
How to regulate other types of new technological innovations? 
Fenwick et al, state that obstacles encountered by innovative companies are not the result of 
technological limitations, but human choice. The law and regulations can limit or prohibit 
commercial exploitation of new technology. These days, disruptive technologies arrive more 
frequently and at a faster pace. That is the reason why the debate around regulatory 
constraints becomes more pressing (Fenwick & Vermeulen, 2015). Regulators often struggle 
to keep up with the paste of development. The amounts of granular data requested by 
regulators makes being compliant for new entrants into the market more complex and 
intrusive. These requirements might discourage innovation in new financial products. 
Automated reporting and advanced analytics to compliance and risk management would help 
regulating the industry; a key ingredient in moving forward is standards (Kaal & Vermeulen, 
2016). 
Existing regulation and new initiatives  
The FCA has responded very positively by launching Project Innovate and asking for input 
from the industry. Their ideas include ‘financial sandboxes’ to test financial concepts with the 
general public. Still, at this point: ‘’Many FinTech companies are discouraged by the time and 
cost of registering and complying with regulations and by the potential consequences if they 
don’t’’ (Ernst and Young, 2014). For start-ups this is especially a problem because of the 
need to have completed registration with the FCA before road-testing their business model. 
Because of this, the FCA is experimenting with fast-track registration schemes. The FCA 
seems to be moving towards a more principles-based strategy according to the measures they 
have taken and plan to take: 
- The Innovation Hub: help innovative businesses to gain fast access to the regulatory 
implications their new business model might have 
- Fast-track authorization: help to internationalize their business 
- Themed support: based on the technology theme, the FCA organizes weeks to support 
stakeholders 
- Regulation Technology (hereafter: RegTech): encouraging new technologies in order 
to regulate the industry 
- Regulatory Sandboxes: where new products, services and delivery models can be 
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safely tested with customers (Ernst and Young, 2014). 
 
In 2014 the FCA opened its innovation HUB for business, part of Project Innovate. The 
main purpose is: ‘’to foster competition and growth in financial services by supporting small 
and large businesses that develop products that improve services for consumers’’ (Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2015: 4). To do this they engage actively with disruptive businesses 
remove possible barriers to innovation (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015: 4). The FCA 
wants to give access to their expertise so that the process of joining financial markets doesn’t 
seem so daunting. In order to participate in this project, businesses need to proof that their 
product benefits end consumers. Businesses who qualify will be granted the following 
services: 
- ‘’A dedicated contact for innovation-related queries, including provision of individual 
guidance and informal steers as appropriate.’’ 
- ‘’Continuation of additional support for up to a year after authorization.’’  
- ‘’Help to understand the regulatory framework and how it applies.’’ 
- ‘’Identify areas where the regulatory regime needs to adapt to facilitate innovation.’’ 
- ‘’Use the expertise gained through our work with firms to inform future policy 
development in a way that supports innovation.’’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014) 
So far (November 2015), the FCA has helped 175 innovative businesses, 5 new 
businesses have been authorized, worked with the government to introduce regulation for 
digital currencies, supported business with difficulties in accessing banking facilities because 
of disproportionate de-risking and hosted a forum on ‘robo-advice’ (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2015: 1).  
The Government Office for Science asked the FCA to explore the opportunities to create a 
regulatory sandbox for financial services. A regulatory sandbox offers opportunities to 
enhance effective competition in the interest of consumers. This is done by: ‘’reducing time 
and cost of getting innovative products to the market, enabling more access to finance for 
innovators, enabling more products to be tested and possibly introduced to the market 
allowing the FCA to work with innovators to protect consumers better’’ (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2015: 2-3).   
Because of the UK’s leading position in attracting financial innovative businesses the 
FCA wants to create an appropriate regulatory framework (Financial Conduct Authority, 
2015). The regulatory sandbox to which is used to road test new businesses in a flexible 
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regulatory framework is one of their ideas to regulate the industry appropriately (FCA, 2015). 
The criteria for requesting a sandbox and/or joining the innovation Hub are the following: 
- ‘’Is the firm in scope: is the planned solution designed for or supports the financial 
services industry?’’ 
- ‘’Genuine innovation: is the solution significantly different to existing offerings?’’ 
- ‘’Consumer benefit: is there an identifiable benefit for consumers?’’ 
- ‘’Does the business have a genuine need for testing within the sandbox framework?’’ 
- ‘’Background research: has the business invested appropriate resources in developing 
the new solution, understanding the applicable regulations, and mitigating the risks?’’ 
(Financial Conduct Authority, 2015: 4). 
The FCA discussed what a sandbox should look like with different firms, trade bodies and 
other stakeholders. Christopher Woolward, Director of Strategy and Competition at the FCA, 
discussed the outcomes of Project Innovate in his speech on the FCA’s role in promoting 
innovation (Christopher Woolward, 2016). According to Woolward, after two years, the 
project led to real results. Some results are the regulatory sandbox, advice unit and their work 
on regulatory technology (RegTech). They have reached great interest globally on their 
innovations in regulation of FinTech (Christopher Woolward, 2016). 
Woolward (2016) sees many potential competition issues in the financial services 
industries: ‘’markets with a few incumbents, difficulties with shopping around and pricing 
and products that can be too complex to understand for consumers’’. In this environment, the 
need to innovate may be limited. New challengers taking market share and multiple disruptors 
pushing larger firms to change their business can enhance competition and potential outcomes 
for consumers (Woolward, 2016). The initiatives by the FCA are not only meant for start-ups 
but also for incumbent firms that want to innovate their services for consumers. ‘’In the past, 
regulators around the globe have watched disruption and innovation with suspicion; our focus 
lies with the possible long-term benefits for the market and greater competition’’ (Woolward, 
2016). For the wider advantages to the UK economy, they also like to attract new businesses 
(Christopher Woolward, 2016). Interests in the Sandbox have been high and have far 
exceeded the FCA’s expectations. Of 69 applications, 24 companies went to develop towards 
testing (Christopher Woolward, 2016). 
The second initiative in Project Innovate is the Advice Unit. It was born out of 
cooperation between the FCA and Treasury, with the target to: ‘’explore the barriers 
preventing people from accessing financial advice. The Advice Unit supports firms 
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developing automated models which seek to deliver lower cost advice’’ (Woolward, 2016). 
Out of 19 applications, nine firms were successful. The nine successful firms have begun the 
process and received regulatory feedback on their models. Lessons learned will be valuable 
for everyone, regulators and firms (Christopher Woolward, 2016). 
The third initiative is ‘RegTech’. Large sums of money and staff are dedicated to the 
business of compliance. Woolward explains: ‘’There can be no doubt of the importance of a 
safe and secure financial system, but we must seek for a more efficient way for firms to fulfill 
their regulatory responsibilities. High costs and inefficient processes can lead to a barrier in 
competition and higher costs for consumers. Therefore the potential role for technology to 
create more efficient and effective processes needs to be explored. By freeing up large sums 
of money, which otherwise be used for compliance, we can create extra space to innovate’’ 
(Christopher Woolward, 2016). The FCA held a ‘TechSprint’ (also known as ‘Hackathon’) to 
bring together financial services providers and technology providers to overcome intractable 
access barriers. This was a global first for a regulator and brought three ideas to be further 
explored and possibly brought to market (Christopher Woolward, 2016). Woolward said: 
‘’We only have to look at the fact that Project Innovate has been copied around the world to 
know that we operate in a competitive international environment’’ (Christopher Woolward, 
2016).  
 
View of the industry on the regulatory approach in the UK 
Several startsups provided their take on this relationship. Ratesetter is a peer-to-peer lending 
platform. Using the crowd as investors for small and medium sized companies up to an 
amount of 500.000 GBP. I interviewed their press officer, Luke O’Mahony, about the way 
they are regulated by the FCA and their relationship (O’Mahony, 2016). 
Out of 180 employees, about six work on compliance and four in the legal team. First 
Ratesetter was supervised by a different organization, in April 2014 the FCA took over. 
Because Ratesetter doesn’t hold any funds, they are not under supervision of the PRA and 
don’t need a banking license. The most important requirements from the FCA are that 
Ratesetter needs to provide: clear consumer information, basic consumer protections around 
client money and a resolution plan needs to be in place (O’Mahony, 2016). 
Ratesetter thinks current regulation is very positive, proportionate and balanced. But it 
does offer a good amount of protection, particularly towards the investors. One of the 
objectives of the FCA is to promote competition, therefore the regulation needs to be 
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proportionate, and Luke O’Mahony thinks they have achieved that with the rules in place. 
There is always room for improvement but rules seem to be effective, sensible and fair 
(O’Mahony, 2016). 
Ratesetter was requested to consult on policy being installed one and a half year ago to 
review the impact. It is quite a normal thing for the FCA to this after the rules have been 
installed. For contact with the FCA they have a specific case manager, contact is mostly via 
email and over the phone. Currently Ratesetter has interim permission from the FCA and their 
working on getting full authorization. Mostly when they talk now it’s about the progress of 
their application (O’Mahony, 2016). 
In 2014 when the FCA took over the supervisory role, they gave existing firms interim 
authorization, a permission to continue trading. New companies that entered after that date 
needed to get full authorization before they could begin to trade. Ironically this led to the 
situation that smaller, less established companies had full authorization while Ratesetter, Zopa 
and Funding Circle (three of the largest peer-to-peer lenders in the UK) had interim 
authorization. The three companies joined together to opt for full regulation in a trade 
organization for peer-to-peer lenders. They thought it would benefit their business and the 
industry if they were fully authorized. Giving investors more security and confidence in what 
they do. They applied in October 2015 for the license, the process is still running and they 
hope to be fully authorized quickly (O’Mahony, 2016). 
What is interesting about the FCA, according to O’Mahony, is that it’s outcomes 
based, rather than input based which he thinks is a good thing. The FCA is happy to be 
responsive on the outcomes of a consultation. Overall they are appropriately responsive 
(O’Mahony, 2016). 
Another peer-to-peer lender in active in the UK as well as in the Netherlands is 
Funding Circle, I interviewed the head of compliance, Gerard Hurley, based in the UK and 
the Dutch managing director, Jeroen Broekema, based in Amsterdam to get their point of 
view on the regulation in both countries. Gerard Hurley is the main point of contact for the 
FCA and previously worked for them (Hurley, 2016). 
Just as Ratesetter, Funding Circle currently has interim permission from the FCA. 
According to Hurley it’s close to having a full license. They also applied for a full license last 
year and they are still working with the FCA to sort out all questions and issues regarding 
application. In 2010, Zopa, Funding Circle and Ratesetter, set up the trade organization for 
peer-to-peer lenders. Later on they individually lobbied governments to set up the legal 
framework for regulation of the peer-to-peer lending sector. The reason for wanting to be 
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fully regulated is to be trustworthy towards their consumers, this is important because they are 
in a very young industry. It will give the consumer some extra trust when they know the 
company deals responsibly with their funds (Hurley, 2016). 
Hurley explains being regulated by the FCA is not ‘light touch’, as there are a lot of 
protections in place for their investors and there are a lot of requirements on their part. But he 
believes they are all sensible things to have. For example, according to Hurley, there are quite 
heavily detailed rules about how we protect our client’s money. The detailed rules serve 
various topics: pre-sale disclosure to investors, how we communicate with them on an 
ongoing basis, marketing and advertisement, arrangements that need to be in place in case of 
a platform failure and heavy duties to prevent financial crime. From the point Funding Circle 
gets their license they need to hold capital, like a bank, but at a much lower level. But that 
will make the company stronger and robust to stick around for the long term. So they think 
it’s a lot of work but it’s necessary so that they can demonstrate to their investors and 
consumers they are the right company to deal with (Hurley, 2016). 
Some regulation in the UK is quite detailed, ‘you must do this and you must not do 
that’, but most is principles and risk-based approach. Ultimately, Hurley says, it’s up to the 
firms to understand what’s relevant and in which proportion given its’ business model and its’ 
resources. The requirements for a small company and what they should do about financial 
crime are lower than for a larger company. Hurley further explains that certainty is really 
what firms like from their regulator. Principle based is effective but having clear rules is more 
easy and black and white. Compared to other industries and countries, he thinks that they 
have a positive relationship with the FCA (Hurley, 2016). 
The peer-to-peer financial association consists of seven members and created it’s own 
minimum standards which all members need to abide by. The rules regard: financial 
currencies, fairness, treatment of client money and systems of control. This means if you want 
to be a member of the group, you need to be serious about these things. In some ways this is a 
form of self-regulation. The association is now lobbying the UK tax office for tax benefits for 
their investors (Hurley, 2016).  
 
Relationship between regulator and regulatee in the UK 
Ratesetter was requested for their input during a consultation of policy that was installed one 
and a half year ago to review the impact. They explain it’s quite a normal thing for them to do 
this after rules have been installed. For contact with the FCA they have a specific case 
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manager, their contact is mostly via email and over the phone (O’Mahony, 2016). O’Mahony 
from Ratesetter says that there is a healthy relationship between his company and the FCA. 
He feels they are pragmatic and respects them. The FCA is happy to be responsive on the 
outcomes of a consultation. Overall they are appropriately responsive (O’Mahony, 2016). 
Gerard Hurley from Funding Circle feels that there is room for improvement for the 
FCA by having more staff available to speak to for medium sized companies. To put this in 
context, the UK is world class in dealing with very small firms (start-ups), Hurley says, 
through Project Innovate they get easy access to the FCA. And for large financial institutions 
they have dozens of staff working on a single company. These companies can pick up the 
phone and say they have difficulties with the interpretation of certain regulation and they can 
get immediate guidance because the people answering the phone know their business model, 
that is not something Funding Circle can do as a medium sized company. Funding Circle has 
no specific case manager within the FCA. Gerard Hurley thinks a specific team or case 
manager for the peer-to-peer lending industry would be beneficial. If they pick up the phone 
now they end up with a call center that has a lot of general knowledge because they serve over 
50.000 firms but not very specific knowledge that is sometimes necessary (Hurley, 2016). 
Funding Circle didn’t really experience any major disputes with the FCA; he says they 
have shown quite some flexibility regarding rules for the sector. He worked on rules for client 
money protection that didn’t worked for the industry (Hurley, 2016). The FCA dedicated 
resources to understanding what the questions were; they published some paper and then 
consulted on new rules and listened to the feedback received from the industry. Eventually 
they changed the client money environment, which provided more certainty for firms (Hurley, 
2016). 
In the next chapter the case of the Dutch FinTech market will be discussed. This 
chapter is structured the same as this chapter. First some background on the regulatory 
landscape and current regulation and then moving towards the empirical evidence on 
FinTech’s ability to influence regulation and the current regulatory approach by the AFM. 
Most empirical evidence is gathered by doing interviews and reading policy documents and 
reports on FinTech regulation. 
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5. The Dutch FinTech market and regulation 
 
This section discusses the Dutch FinTech market and the current regulatory framework. First 
a general description of what the market looks like in the Netherlands followed by a short 
description of the general regulatory framework in the Netherlands to apply some context. 
Then some background and theory on how rapid changing technologies should be regulated in 
general and an overview of the current regulatory initiatives on FinTech. Then on to the most 
important part of this chapter is the empirical evidence section where both the views of the 
industry as well as the regulator on current regulation and the relationship between regulator 
and regulatee will be discussed. Finally a short section that showcases the view of the Dutch 
industry and regulator on the UK regulatory approach. 
The FinTech market is growing rapidly in the Netherlands, still, compared to the US 
and UK the market is relatively small. In Europe, the share of FinTech funding amounts in the 
Netherlands is about 21 percent. Whilst the UK and Ireland market own a share of 43 percent 
of the total investments in Europe, there is no lack of ideas and initiatives in the Netherlands 
(Price Waterhouse and Coopers, 2016). The group of FinTech companies has become large 
enough to produce an annual top-50. FinTech’s are drawn to the Netherlands because of 
infrastructure, international focus, presence of peers and language skills. Funding seems to be 
more of an issue, but with London close, there is potential access to investors (Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers, 2016). The FinTech survey shows that traditional financial 
institutions have interests in the FinTech industry as well, 26 percent of the respondents 
engage in joint partnerships with FinTech’s and 18 percent set up venture capital funds for the 
industry. Challenges which are named for FinTech’s and traditional financial institutions are: 
regulatory uncertainty, differences in management and culture and differences in knowledge 
and skills. Traditional financial companies foresee a loss in business activities to FinTech of a 
fifth. The lack of clarity about the regulation of FinTech affects co-operation negatively (Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers, 2016). 
Some of the biggest FinTech companies on the Dutch market are listed on the website 
of Holland FinTech (Holland FinTech, 2016). This is the Dutch trade organization for the full 
range of FinTech companies in the Netherlands as well as ‘traditional’ financial institutions 
interested in new financial technologies. Their main goal is to provide access to insights, 
business, technology, capital, regulation and talent. They do research on the Dutch and global 
FinTech market and organize events for all different stakeholders in the industry. For this 
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thesis FundingCircle, Jungo and Adyen have been interviewed. They are active in the peer-to-
peer lending market and payment services. An employee of the Authority of Financial 
Markets (AFM), who works within their FinTech and Innovation department, has also been 
interviewed about the specific case of regulation of FinTech. The AFM and DNB are the two 
most important financial regulators in the country. DNB is responsible for prudential 
oversight and the AFM for behavioral oversight, but on many topics, such as FinTech they 
cooperate on a regular basis.  
 
What does the general regulatory landscape look like in the Netherlands?  
In the Netherlands regulatory reform gained momentum in the 1990’s, specific programs 
emerged to make regulation more clear. The Netherlands looked for ways to reduce 
administrative burdens. Just as in the UK, ex ante impact assessments became more 
commonly used to avoid problems of the past. In the late 1990s a second phase arose to avoid 
administrative burdens for business to promote a more innovative, enterprising and 
competitive economy (OECD, 2009: 11).    
A report from the OECD on regulation in European Union countries characterizes the 
Dutch regulatory environment. The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state with three 
tiers of government (central, provinces and municipalities). The civil service’s efficiency is 
contiously being improved. Traditionally, the Dutch approach is a corporatist philosophy. The 
OECD (2009) qualifies the Dutch regulatory system as followed: ‘’Principles of consensus 
building and the use of expert advice to improve regulatory quality’’. The developments in 
the 1990s led to a more open and market driven approach to processes of policy 
developments. There exists a program specifically aimed at regulatory burden reduction 
(OECD, 2009: 11-12).        
The Netherlands accomplished good results on the Standard Cost Methodology (SCM) 
for the reduction of administrative burdens to businesses. They reached the target of a 25 
percent net reduction for costs to business (OECD, 2009: 12). 
 
Existing regulation and new initiatives  
Due to developments in technology and the widely spread use of smartphones, financial 
markets are changing rapidly. Consumers move towards digital channels for their financial 
products. Firms from the industry have adapted to these changes and this has a great impact 
on consumers: the costs of brokers and financial services dropped, more different products are 
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available to everyone and products that are offered became more transparent. These 
developments are coming faster and faster. The availability of data in combination with 
techniques to use this information (artificial intelligence) leads to more complex products 
being automated (Authoriteit Financiele Markten, 2016). This transition leads to challenges 
for regulation: how do we interpret ‘duty of care’ when advice has been given by a self-
learning IT-system that gives advice based on different data-sources? The AFM wants to 
support innovations that contribute to our financial well-being but also addresses the related 
risks (Authoriteit Financiele Markten, 2016).  They have noticed that technological 
innovation puts pressure on the way they supervise the industry. Nowadays a large part of 
their oversight works through influencing large financial institutions. When the market 
structure changes and when the influence large institutions have reduce, this model will no 
longer work. Further it’s undesirable when new entrants are being confronted with an 
unnecessary burden of regulation and costs. In the interest of healthy competition the burdens 
need to be as low as possible. For this reason, the AFM invests in project ‘Innovation and 
FinTech’. Innovations that serve the interest of consumers will be supported and the AFM 
wants to contribute to new regulation for these new concepts and market-entrants (Authoriteit 
Financiele Markten, 2016). 
De Nederlandse Bank and AFM joined forces to expand the possibilities for 
innovative initiatives on the financial market. Part of this initiative is to invite financial 
institutions to respond to propositions for a more accessible supervisory regime for innovative 
financial services. Also part of this initiative is the joint project: Innovation Hub, the place 
where innovative firms can meet their future supervisors about questions in the areas of 
financial innovation and regulation. In a published proposition paper, the AFM and DNB ask 
the market to help and think about possibilities to improve oversight and responsible 
innovation in the financial industry (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2016). The goal is to check 
which adaptions on policy might be necessary (Autoriteit Financiele Markten, 2016).   
 One of the most important implications for innovation of the financial industry, inside 
and outside of existing law and regulation, is the ‘regulatory sandbox’. It is building on the 
initiative from their British colleague, the FCA. Other options that have been introduced are a 
conditional license and a voluntary banking license (‘opt-in’) (Autoriteit Financiele Markten, 
2016).            
  To establish a proper view about the regulation of FinTech in the Netherlands I spoke 
with an employee of the AFM who is part of the project Innovation and FinTech for about six 
months (AFM employee, 2016). The project originated to deal with the challenges of 
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technological innovations in the financial industry in relation to regulation. One of his main 
tasks is to develop a strategy to tackle these challenges. He works primarily on the Innovation 
Hub and explains they’ve reached quite some results with this. The Innovation Hub started 
officially early June 2016. Further he helps developing the Sandbox, an initiative copied from 
the FCA. For the AFM it’s important to spot when technological companies enter their 
industry and thereby fall within the AFM’s supervisory jurisdiction. He highlights the 
importance of interaction with all stakeholders, thereby finding a balance between 
accommodating innovation and discouraging unwanted innovations (AFM employee, 2016). 
 Their main goal is to make the industry more efficient, fair and transparent. In 
contrast with other views, the AFM states that actively helping and accommodating new 
innovations is not done from the perspective of enhancing competition, according to them this 
task lies with the Authority for Consumers and Market (ACM) (AFM employee, 2016). 
The AFM’s employee explains when a start-up wants to enter the market, the AFM 
likes to address questions and problems that are raised as quickly as possible, either face-to-
face or over the phone. Traditional requests for a license, meaning a request with the absence 
of an innovative product, but business as they know it, still have to go through the ‘old’ 
application process. If a company with a ‘new’ type of product consults about the possibilities 
of going into business, they are invited to a informal meeting to talk and receive guidance and 
the AFM will supply their vision on the business model with a team of experts on for example 
crowd-funding or mortgages. After this conversation, companies are redirected to the right 
department within the AFM for a license, if the idea wrings with the law, the AFM can review 
if there are possibilities for different interpretations of the law (AFM employee, 2016). 
 There are three different options when a business model is unable to comply with 
existing rules and regulation. The first possibility, as already mentioned, is to see if the 
existing law or regulation can be interpreted in a sense that it can fit the new business model. 
The second possibility is to start a policy process with the Ministry of Finance to change the 
existing law. The third possibility is experimenting in a Sandbox, within a fixed timeframe 
and with a limited number of consumers the company get’s the chance to experiment with 
their product (this option is not available yet in the Netherlands, but in the process of being 
installed). When one of these steps is taken, they can explore the possibilities of applying for 
a license or exemption of a license (AFM employee, 2016).   
 Besides the Dutch market, the AFM is in touch with a lot of FinTech’s and fellow 
regulators abroad. He names the UK, Australian and Singaporean regulators as being in the 
lead in regulating FinTech. The Dutch regulators are not specifically busy attracting new 
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FinTechs to the Netherlands. The AFM’s employee says that on a political level, Minister 
Dijsselbloem is trying to attract more business by changing bonus structures for foreign 
companies. The AFM and DNB just want to be groundbreaking and progressive regulators 
(AFM employee, 2016). 
The employee of the AFM says: ‘’The nature of the AFM’s attitude is reactive, as a 
regulator it’s difficult to be proactive because they need to respond to innovation from the 
industry and can’t forecast these developments. It is a trend within DNB, AFM and ACM to 
look more at the principles of the law instead of formal interpretations’’ (AFM employee, 
2016). The most important thing is to live up to the spirit of the law; this means that the law 
can be interpreted in a wider sentence. He explains that the AFM tries to be more responsive 
and proactive and has received very positive feedback from the industry. Further he elaborates 
on his experience with the industry: ‘’At every event where I see FinTech’s doing 
presentation, there’s always a slide in their presentation complaining about the regulator 
and/or a regulatory burden’’ (AFM employee, 2016). He thinks that’s very justly, if the 
industry wouldn’t have that feeling, there would be something wrong. The AFM’s main role 
is still supervisor and not there to accommodate every new idea easily without accessing 
whether is good for the consumers and the market. On the other side, if this idea within the 
market is tenacious in nature, there might be reason for the AFM to do something with the 
critique (AFM employee, 2016). A solution to this issue could be the Sandbox, which the 
AFM’s employee explains as: ‘’really meant as a way of helping businesses come to the 
markets with their product as quickly as possible’’ (AFM employee, 2016). Their approach in 
reacting to critique on the regulatory burden they experience includes asking actively: ‘’If you 
see a problem or burden, bring us some examples or cases and we’ll see what we can do. If 
they challenge this idea like this, they often notice there aren’t many concrete cases’’ (AFM 
employee, 2016).  
 
 
View of the industry on the regulatory approach in the Netherlands 
In order to establish a point of view of the industry on how FinTech is currently regulated in 
the Netherlands, I have used several reports and other documents and conducted interviews 
with Dutch FinTech companies.  
Holland FinTech conducted a research in cooperation with consultancy agency Roland 
Berger. They conducted 20 interviews with a broad range of experts from FinTechs, venture 
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capital funds and banks. The key topics of their interviews were financial innovation in the 
Netherlands, rules and regulations, regulatory supervision and FinTech eco-system. Further 
they held a legal round table with 15 experts on regulation with respect to financial services 
(Holland FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016).                              
According to their research the FinTech three key barriers hinder sector in the 
Netherlands: gaps in and rigidity of regulation and legal framework, regulatory 
execution/supervision and collaboration. Current regulation and legal framework do no cater 
to various new FinTech applications and lack clarity. Additionally regulation is not aligned 
across Europe. Regulatory supervisory authorities are short on knowledge and coordination, 
and decisiveness is therefore lacking, however AFM recently created a dedicated FinTech 
team that will help to improve on current attention points. In countries with a robust FinTech 
sector, governments developed a strong vision for the sector, which helped to overcome these 
barriers; the government have proven their ability to drive successful initiatives. The 
government’s priority should be to develop a vision of the FinTech sector within the 
Netherlands. Is the ambition to be a front-runner and develop a leading FinTech sector? Or is 
it just the ambition to facilitate only and be a follower? The strictness of Dutch regulation 
makes the Netherlands less attractive to FinTech (Holland FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016). 
One of my interviewees is FundingCircle, a crowd-funding platform originated in the 
UK and with its own office in the Netherlands, led by managing director Jeroen Broekema. 
Their business model is connecting private and corporate investors to small and medium sized 
companies who seek for loans through their online platform up to an amount of 100.000 
euros. I interviewed him about his vision on current regulation and their relationship with the 
regulators. Their compliance and legal teams are based centrally in London but Broekema is 
responsible for regulatory affairs in the Netherlands (Broekema, 2016). 
Funding Circle is currently not licensed by the AFM but holds an exemption to act as 
an intermediary with their lending platform. Broekema expects that there might come a 
specific license in the future for the business they conduct (Broekema, 2016). According to 
Broekema, the AFM is not fully prepared for their type of business yet. In general he thinks 
the current regulation of his company is ‘good’, they are still in a very early stage and there is 
oversight but not too much. He prefers the current mix between on the one side the larger 
problems being dealt with and on the other side not kill a new industry with a load of complex 
regulation. Broekema feels the AFM and his firm share the same goal by avoiding ‘bad’ 
companies to enter the market and at the same time make the industry grow (Broekema, 
2016). 
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The second company I interviewed in the Netherlands is Jungo, a crowd funding 
mortgage lender in the process of going live with their product in the following months. They 
provide mortgages for private clients funded by institutional investors in combination with the 
crowd. About 80 percent of a single mortgage is funded by institutional investors and 20 
percent by the crowd. Because the institutional investors are the first creditors and only 
provide 80 percent of the total funding, there risk is limited and they receive relatively low 
interest rates. As second creditor, the crowd delivers a more vulnerable investment, leading to 
higher interest returns for them. A combination of both interest rates leads to the interest rate 
the mortgagor needs to pay. Jungo is in the middle and brings the parties together, arranges 
contracts and takes a fee for the administrative process (Hoogland, 2016). 
For this research I interviewed the CTO and co-founder of Jungo, Jasper Hoogland. 
Within the company (consisting of three), one person is responsible for legal and regulatory 
affairs together with lawyers they hire from time to time. Jungo currently holds a license for 
the provision of mortgage credit from the AFM. They started in a very early stage with 
applying for the license, it took a few months to prepare for the application. At this point, 
their business model is one of a kind in the Netherlands. After their application they sat and 
discussed their business model with the AFM, Hoogland explains how this process went: 
‘’When Jungo wants to do something in a certain manner they ask the AFM, when they say 
‘no’ you have to come up with your own solution to the problem. They are not allowed to 
give advice and tell exactly how it would work. They have the roll of supervisor and not 
adviser, which they definitely don’t want to be’’ (Hoogland, 2016). Jungo consults lawyers 
and consultants to fix these issues.  
Hoogland doesn’t have the image that the AFM is very welcoming to make innovative 
new entrants enter the financial industry. There is no distinction made between ABN AMRO 
and for instance us as a FinTech. The idea that the Dutch supervisor is very welcoming to new 
businesses is according to Hoogland: ‘’more a political statement then actually the attitude of 
the supervisor’’ (Hoogland, 2016). Jungo was not able to make use of the Innovation Hub for 
FinTech because it originated after they applied for their license. They didn’t make use of the 
possibility for consultations on new policies; he can’t recall that they have been consulted for 
this reason (Hoogland, 2016). 
Jungo joined the trade organization Holland FinTech for their network and interesting 
events they organize. If they run into problems they can contact the organization to see if they 
can help. They had quite some disputes and discussions in their contact with the AFM. Mostly 
because what they do, there exists no regulation for: ‘’The AFM researches if your business 
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model fits in existing regulation, if not, it’s a no. Sometimes this comes across as very rigid 
and the AFM should in some cases look further than the possibilities within the existing legal 
framework’’ (Hoogland, 2016). He understands their differences to some extent because the 
AFM is there in a completely different role, but Jungo wants to move on with their product 
and likes to be supported from a regulatory perspective also (Hoogland, 2016). 
The third company I interviewed within the Dutch FinTech market is Adyen. Dagmar 
van Ravenswaay Claasen is their director Regulatory Affairs. Adyen is a payment service 
provider and has been able to become one of the largest in the world in a short period of time 
(9 years) by incorporating all different payment methods available in their platform. They 
have received investments from major tech companies like Facebook. About 20 out of 500 
employees work in compliance, legal and regulatory affairs. Adyen is under supervision of 
DNB, and for transparency requirements the AFM. Which of the two authorities provides 
your license is divided into sectors. Adyen holds a payment service provider license. A 
license that derived from the 2007 PSD (payment service directive), part of ECB policy. Most 
of the dialogue with Adyen was about their relationship with the regulator, explained further 
in the next chapter. 
  
Relationship between regulator and regulatee in the Netherlands 
Opinions on the relationship between regulator and regulatee vary between the different 
companies and research conducted by Holland FinTech. The trade organization names 
collaboration as one of the key barriers. They explain there is room for improved structured 
collaboration between start-ups, banks and government. Collaboration mechanisms should be 
established to tackle jointly tackle subjects and include public partners and international 
counterparts. It is important to involve government as well as regulators into discussions 
about FinTech. Further they suggest cross border cooperation between different FinTech 
Hubs (Holland FinTech and Roland Berger, 2016). 
Funding Circle (Dutch office) is more positive about the collaboration with their 
regulator (AFM). They have contact often and Funding Circle feels their input is used by the 
AFM (Broekema, 2016). On a formal and informal base they have been consulted on new 
policy and regulation and used these opportunities to show their point of view. Besides these 
consultations, they have been invited several times to talk with the AFM during meetings and 
events, Broekema explains the relationship as very responsive. He elaborates further on the 
reason why he thinks they act in such a responsive manner: ‘’The biggest driver for the AFM 
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to be as responsive as they are right now is to enhance competition in the financial industry, 
because in the Netherlands only three large banks deal with almost everything and are 
dominating the financial market’’ (Broekema, 2016). 
Hoogland from Jungo says they are invited on a regular basis for stakeholder 
meetings, specifically focused on FinTech. Further they joined a meeting organized by 
Holland FinTech were they were able to discuss policy with the AFM. In these types of 
meetings questions are raised like: how is your business developing? And what problems do 
you run into regarding regulation? (Hoogland, 2016).  
Dagmar van Ravenswaay Claasen (Adyen) speaks with DNB on a regular basis, 
mostly through quarterly meetings and regarding research they conduct. They responded to 
consultations on new regulation as well. She explains there is a specific team within DNB that 
focuses on payment service providers and within that team is, what they call, the first 
supervisor which they primarily have contact with. Van Ravenswaay Claasen describes the 
relationship with the DNB as ‘good’ and becoming better over time. She experienced a rise in 
understanding from DNB about what Adyen does and in what context: ‘’In the beginning they 
didn’t really stop by, most information exchange was based on reporting. Now we are actually 
developing an understanding. Nevertheless, they remain in their role as supervisor, and they 
won’t hesitate to tell you what’s wrong after a research or report’’ (Van Ravenswaay Claasen, 
2016). 
An employee of the AFM feels there exists an active relationship with the industry and 
other stakeholders like Holland FinTech. The founder of Holland FinTech, Don Ginsel, is a 
good source to them because of his extensive network within the industry (AFM employee, 
2016). In his role as regulator the employee also visit events organized by the trade 
organization: ‘‘during these events the AFM wants to exhibit their approachability’’ (AFM 
employee, 2016). In the summer of 2015 the AFM published a discussion document on new 
policy where the business could respond to, they received many consultations from the 
industry. In response to these consultations they have invited multiple stakeholders to a 
meeting to discuss their point of view (AFM employee, 2016). 
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What is the view of the Dutch industry and regulator on the regulatory approach 
in the regulation of FinTech in the UK? 
Empirical evidence has shown that the UK is on the forefront of regulating the FinTech 
industry. The Dutch regulator seems to look closely at what the UK is doing. In this part some 
thoughts are presented, mainly by Holland FinTech, on what the Dutch government could 
learn from the UK. 
 Holland FinTech uses the UK case in terms of best practices to learn from for the 
Dutch case. According to Holland FinTech, the UK is the global leader in FinTech and they 
named four policy settings that helped achieve its goal: regulatory restraints as a driver, direct 
subsidies, competition law and supportive regulatory environment (Holland FinTech & 
Roland Berger, 2016). The FCA was on the forefront of regulating FinTech, they launched 
Project Innovate in October 2014 to offer direct support to innovative firms trying to launch 
new products. They provided these firms with a dedicated team and contact, which remains 
available until after a year the companies have been authorized. The team helps businesses to 
understand the regulatory framework and its’ application to their business (Holland FinTech 
& Roland Berger, 2016). 
Further, contemporary/temporary permits are available for businesses to enable start-ups to 
delay full compliance up to two years, decreasing the initial costs/burden. They actively try to 
attract business by sending international representatives abroad. The UK is widely regarded as 
one of the most welcoming to FinTech. Project Innovate and the regulatory Sandbox are 
valued highly by FinTech innovators. The FCA uses the ‘right touch’ to approach the sector, 
on the one hand providing enough regulation to maintain investor confidence while giving 
new players the freedom to innovate. This was the vision that derived from the report by 
Holland FinTech and consultancy agency Roland Berger, and offers a very positive view on 
UK regulation (Holland FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016). 
When looking at the way the AFM conducts their regulation of the FinTech industry, 
some similarities can be spotted with the UK. The AFM explained that the Sandbox idea was 
mainly copied from the UK. The big difference the AFM names between the two is that the 
UK version is more supervisory ‘light’ and this has to do with the differences in mandate both 
regulators have (AFM employee, 2016). By looking at these initiatives copied from the FCA, 
like Project Innovate and the Sandbox and also the amount of times the UK regulator was 
named during my interview with the AFM, the UK regulator seems to be the regulatory front-
runner as explained by Holland FinTech in their research. In contrast with other countries like 
the UK, the Dutch regulators don’t try to be a supervisor ‘light’ for FinTech just to attract 
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business. The reason why is the perspective that the most important objective is to create a 
fair, transparent and sustainable market (AFM employee, 2016).   
Challenges the employee of the AFM sees for the future regard mainly international 
cooperation within Europe: ‘’All the different regulatory bodies on the EU-level are too 
fragmented. With the upcoming developments in the next ten years these need to be better 
integrated. At this point there are various regulations on the financial industry that are 
contrary to each other. This is very difficult and confusing for the industry to work with. The 
increasing complexity of the market leads to increased complex regulation. There is still much 
to achieve at this point’’ (AFM employee, 2016). He sees the current innovations as relatively 
small compared what might happens when complete systems of banks start using blockchain 
or when Robo-advice becomes commonly used (AFM employee, 2016). 
So far, this empirical section has shown that the approach of the two regulators differs 
on some points but also show a lot of similarities. The industries perspective varies in both 
countries and among the different companies and some challenges for the regulators are 
portrayed, but mainly the results show quite a positive view on current regulation. 
Stakeholders seem to be able to influence, or at least, share their opinion on current regulation 
with the regulatory offices. The next chapter analyzes the empirical evidence along the 
theories from the literature review to determine, whether and to what extent the industry is 
able to influence regulation and to see how the regulatory approach fits into the theoretical 
framework. 
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6. Analysis 
This thesis aims to investigate the extent to which the FinTech industry is able to influence 
financial regulation and how regulators respond to the emergence of new innovative financial 
products in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In this section I will evaluate the 
existing theories on stakeholder influence and government regulatory approaches  
against the empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter.  
We have seen that some scholars predict that active lobbying leads to more risk taking 
by financial institutions, and that there is a connection between active lobbying by financial 
institutions and their loan-to-income ratios (Igan et al., 2011). In connection to this thesis, 
active lobbying strategies by (groups of) FinTech companies and close collaboration between 
FinTech companies and their regulators may thus lead to more risk taking and eventually 
leads to risks for their consumers and our economy (Igan et al., 2011). This research stresses 
the importance of a healthy relationship between regulator and regulatee to avoid extensive 
risk-taking that might lead to a crisis. Other scholars, point out that classic forms of regulation 
are inappropriate for the FinTech industry (Arnet et al., 2015; Vermeulen et al., 2016). There 
is an international trend in advocating alternatives to classical regulation, meaning other 
forms of regulation instead of defined legal standards backed by sanctions (Lodge & Wegrich, 
2012). Omarova (2010) even suggests industry wide self-regulation, to impose the 
responsibility of protecting the public from future crises directly on the financial services. 
Other academics argue that the financial industry’s ability to influence regulation has become 
more partial and contingent than expected by most. The GFC has made lobbying more of an 
uphill battle than before and affected the industry’s lobbying tools (Young, 2013). Potters & 
Sloof (1996) argue that the size of the membership of an industry helps when trying to 
influence policy, FinTech is relatively small in comparison to the ‘traditional’ financial 
industry. This would lead to the assumption that the industry would have a hard time 
influencing policy.  
Because this thesis found evidence that the regulator is actually very welcoming to 
input from the industry, this assumption by Young proves not to hold for the FinTech 
industry. Still, the influence of the GFC cannot be overlooked, as it seems to have positively 
affected the relationship between industry and regulator as well as policy that makes entering 
the market for FinTech easier. Regulators seem to want to enhance effective competition in 
the industry. Expert knowledge is seen as an important tool in the exchange of goods between 
regulator and regulatee. If there exists a knowledge gap between the two parties, the industry 
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can gain access to the policy arena by sharing their knowledge of the industry (Bouwen, 
2002). In an industry where the regulator is always one step behind because of technological 
innovations, this information can be valuable for the regulator.  
Because FinTech emerged post-GFC, its hard to measure whether the industry’s 
lobbying tools have been affected, but the empirical evidence presented in the previous 
chapter suggests that FinTech companies have played an active role in shaping regulation. 
This is inescapable, because the technical knowledge tends to be on the side of FinTech 
companies, and, as we will see below, both FinTech companies and regulators have an 
interest in shaping this regulation together.  What the research has also shown is that in the 
UK the FCA responded quickly with all sorts of initiatives to improve the regulation of 
FinTech: innovation hub, fast-track authorization, support weeks for stakeholders, regulatory 
technology and regulatory sandboxes. The Dutch approach has been less flexible, as Dutch 
regulators tried at first to apply old rules to the new start-ups. Holland FinTech claims that the 
UK ‘project innovate’ and the regulatory sandbox are valued highly by FinTech innovators. 
The FCA uses the ‘right’ touch to approach the sector, on the one hand providing enough 
regulation to maintain investor confidence while giving new players the freedom to innovate 
(Holland FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016). 
 
Lobbying and regulation in the UK 
Regarding the prediction of theory that lobbying leads to more risk taking, this relationship is 
hard to establish for a young industry like FinTech. What we do know from the conducted 
interviews is that the FCA is consulting companies on a regular basis. There exists a rather 
strong collaboration between young financial companies and the FCA. Companies are 
provided with a dedicated contact within the FCA to help them whenever they run into 
regulatory issues or having trouble understanding the regulatory framework. Funding Circle 
(UK) explains that the FCA has shown quite some flexibility regarding rules for the sector. 
Some rules on client money protection did not work for the industry. After consultation, the 
FCA listened to feedback received by the industry; eventually they changed the client money 
environment, which provided more certainty for firms (Hurley, 2016). This is also in line with 
the assumption that interest group influence is an exchange of ‘goods’; the regulator ask for 
input (knowledge) from the industry and the industry is able to inserts its preferences 
(Bouwen, 2002). According to Potters & Van Winden (1991), this can only happen if there 
exists sufficient congruence between the preferences of the players. This seems to be the case, 
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especially in the UK where the FCA want’s to promote effective competition by adding more 
players to the market.   
Academics argue that the financial industry’s ability to influence regulation has 
become more partial and contingent than expected by most (Young, 2013). The GFC has 
made lobbying more of an uphill battle than before and affected the industry’s lobbying tools. 
This might be true for the ‘traditional’ financial institutions but FinTech seems to have a 
special role within the whole of the financial industry; besides other tasks, the FCA is also 
there to promote effective competition (AFM employee, 2016). Creating more competition in 
the financial industry might lead to a better functioning market than pre-GFC. This can be 
seen as a reason why the FinTech industry has been given all of these tools: stakeholder 
events organized by the FCA, innovation hubs to accelerate growth and room for 
contributing/consulting on regulation. In this case, influence on regulation and the industries 
lobbying tools have not been affected negatively by the crisis but positively.  
 Traditionally, classical forms of regulation, mostly command and control and strict 
rules backed by sanctions have been used to control industries (Lodge & Wegricht, 2012). 
The developments in regulating FinTech have shown a trend towards more collaborative 
forms of regulation. Industry and regulators join each other during events about regulation of 
the industry and start-ups within FinTech are invited by the FCA to start their business within 
the so-called ‘sandbox’. Thus, classical forms of regulation have become less popular, also for 
the financial industry. New forms of regulation in the UK seem to be more cooperative and 
principle-based instead of rules-based. Opposite to classical regulation, at the extreme of the 
scale is self-regulation, which Omarova (2010) suggested for the financial industry. Shifts of 
regulatory power towards self-regulatory bodies like trade organizations can’t be spotted in 
the UK. A conglomerate of crowd-lenders did opt to be fully authorized and regulated by the 
FCA to prove their businesses legitimacy (O’Mahoney, 2016). 
 Research of Arner et al. (2015) predicts that new technology companies tend to lack a 
compliance culture that identifies prudential and consumer protection. This lack of regulatory 
compliance might come from companies that believe not to be subject to the rules or are just 
not aware of the rules that may apply. However, the research conducted for this thesis shows 
that this is not always the case. Ratesetter and FundingCircle were both well aware of their 
obligations on regulation. Both companies had specific teams dealing with regulation and 
were also in favor to become fully authorized by the FCA, giving investors and consumers 
more confidence in the industry. However, these two companies are both quite large (300+ 
employees).  Small start-ups having to deal with the costs of a compliance team or consulting 
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firm to be able to comply with rules and regulation face a proportionally larger burden. 
Problems include being unaware of the rules or unable to comply might be more common 
with early stage start-ups. To avoid stifling these smaller companies, the FCA organizes a 
number of supportive projects by the FCA that help early stage FinTech start-ups.  
 Deciding when to intervene in a new market is difficult. Intervention is not supposed 
to come too quickly, so that growth of the market is being slowed down, but also not too late 
so the potential risks have already done their damage. Arner et al., advise a ‘wait and see 
approach’ and wait for the market to ‘settle’. Because FinTech emerged in the shadow of the 
GFC, the industry caught the attention of the FCA pretty early but chose not to fully regulate 
the industry immediately but work with interim authorization and semi-constructions at the 
beginning. Hereby the FCA could remain responsive and flexible, dealing with innovations in 
a reactive way.  
 Theory advises to create dynamic principle-based regulation for the FinTech industry. 
Regulation should be strict enough to keep consumers and investors trust and at the same time 
flexible enough to not distort innovation. More weight should be given to the spirit of a 
regulation, rather than box-ticking. My respondents indicated that in the early phase of a start-
up in the FinTech industry, while they are part of ‘project innovate’, regulation seems more 
principle-based. The regulator offers space to road test a company’s ideas without the full 
burden of all rules and regulations. Later on when a company has matured a bit, they will be 
regulated like every other financial institution in there sector, meaning regulation will shift 
towards more rules-based backed by sanctions when being non-compliant.  
 According to Vermeulen et al., knowing what, when and how regulations should be 
structured when constant, complex and disruptive technological innovations are happening is 
difficult. We already zoomed in on the ‘when’ question earlier. The ‘what’ question is about 
identifying the technology that must be regulated. Demarcating the scope of a technology may 
not always be self-evident. The ‘how’ question is about the form and substance of the 
regulation. Should the innovation be encouraged, restricted or prohibited in some way? 
FinTech has received much encouragement in the UK. They want their capital to be the 
largest FinTech hub in the world and specifically tried to create an environment were 
innovative companies can flourish. The reason why FinTech is welcomed comes from the 
possible advantages for consumers and the market resulting from more effective competition.  
 Whether the size of its membership of an industry has any influence on the abilities 
lobby effectively is hard to measure. Potters & Van Winden (1996) claim this is the case. In 
order to test this claim a comparative study should be done on the influence of for example 
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the ‘traditional’ financial industry compared to FinTech. However, this thesis is still able to 
show that a relative small industry like FinTech is able to influence regulations. The size of 
the industry therefore does not seem to be that relevant when other factors, such as the 
imbalance of knowledge. Therefore, the approach that treats information as an exchangeable 
good works better at explaining the amount of influence the industry has in this case 
(Bouwen, 2002). Because of informational needs on both the regulator’s side as well as the 
industry, there exists some sort of interdependency between both parties.  Regulation can be 
complicated and hard to comply too for businesses and the regulator needs to understand what 
developments are happening within the industry. 
 
Lobbying and Regulation in the Netherlands  
In the Netherlands, the AFM and DNB are responsible for the regulation of FinTech. They are 
both responsible for a different type of oversight but often join forces for specific projects. 
Earlier research conducted by academics on the lobbying activities of banks led to the 
conclusion that active lobbying strategies lead to more risk taking. This could impose risks for 
consumers and our economy. Nevertheless, Dutch regulators have also tried to include 
FinTech companies as they devise new rules. Funding Circle has been consulted on formal 
and informal base on new policy and regulation and used these opportunities to show their 
point of view. Not only Funding Circle but also Adyen and Jungo are invited on a regular 
basis to visit stakeholder events and join in other meetings to share their point of view on 
policy. Holland FinTech is the Dutch trade organization for FinTech, organizing monthly 
events where business and regulator often come together to discuss developments in the 
industry. There seems to be quite extensive collaboration between the two parties and room 
for the industry to elaborate on what they want from the regulator. 
The argument that lobbying tools have been affected by the GFC does not apply to the 
FinTech industry. Just as in the UK, in the Netherlands there are many ways for the industry 
to sit at the table with regulators, either invited to an informal meeting or formal events where 
business meets the regulator. There is some disagreement between the interviewees whether 
the AFM listen to policy remarks, however. Jeroen Broekema of Funding Circle is very 
positive about how responsive the AFM is and listens to the industry. Jasper Hoogland from 
Jungo sees the AFM really as a supervisor and not and advisor and does not have the image 
that the AFM is very welcoming to newcomers in the industry. Dagmar van Ravenswaay 
Claasen of Adyen tells me their relationship with DNB is good and getting better over time. 
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She experienced a rise in understanding about what Adyen does and in what context. Officials 
of the DNB stop by now and then and in this way an actual understanding is being built. 
Nevertheless, they remain in their role as supervisor according to Raavenswaay Claasen. An 
employee of the AFM explained there exists an active relationship with the industry and other 
stakeholders like Holland FinTech. The AFM organizes events but also visits the events 
organized by the trade organization to showcase their approachability. Lobbying tools for the 
FinTech industry were, according to these opinions, not affected by the GFC and seem to be 
very strong, why they are not affected is best explained by Broekema’s vision: ‘The biggest 
driver for the AFM to be as responsive as they are right now is to enhance competition in the 
financial industry, because in the Netherlands only three large banks deal with almost 
everything and are dominating the financial market’. Thus, both the regulator and the FinTech 
companies see themselves as aligned in a struggle to limit the influence of the larger banks 
and challenge their market share. For the regulator, this is about avoiding a repeat of the GFC, 
when the three large banks all experienced major losses and were bailed out by the taxpayer; 
for the FinTech companies, this is primarily about having regulatory support to challenge the 
large banks for market share. The industry’s extensive influence can be well explained by the 
fact there is sufficient congruence between the preferences of the players leading to scope for 
informational lobbying (Potters & Van Winden, 1991).  
Nevertheless, most rules and regulations in the Netherlands still seem to be command 
and control and strict rules backed by sanctions. Hoogland and Van Ravenswaay Claasen both 
think the Dutch supervisors are quite rigid. There is a difference in how they interpret this, 
Hoogland thinks the AFM could to some extent be a bit more cooperative with young new 
market entrants, Van Ravenswaay Claasen however believes this is just their role as 
supervisor and this is part of the game. At the same time, there appears to be a growing 
awareness among regulators that a new approach is needed. There are many initiatives, most 
of them copied from the FCA, which seem to move towards more collaborative and 
responsive forms of regulation. These initiatives include: regulatory sandbox, innovation hub 
and many events, which are organized to gather input from the industry. But these initiatives 
all do not go as far as the suggestion by Omarova (2010) to create industry wide self-
regulation. The stakes for consumers and our economy are probably too high to leave 
regulation to the industry itself. 
Research suggests that challenges for new technology companies in the FinTech 
industry have to do with a lack of compliance that identifies prudential and consumer 
protection (Arner et al., 2015). Some companies see themselves as not subject to the rules or 
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are just not aware of the rules that may apply (Arner et al., 2015). Part of educating young 
FinTech companies is the Dutch Innovation Hub and the emergence of the Sandbox, which in 
the Netherlands is still in the process of being installed. These tools could help young 
companies to develop the necessary compliance culture to deal responsibly with prudential 
and consumer protection. However, these tools have not been available for long and newer 
companies have had some trouble navigating the new rules. Jungo, which started the process 
of being licensed as a mortgage lender had to go through the old process. Jungo experienced 
some trouble with their application because their business model was new and unable to fit 
directly into the existing legal framework of the AFM. In their opinion the AFM needs to look 
further than the possibilities in the existing legal framework (Hoogland, 2016). Being 
compliant to regulation did not seem much of an issue for the Dutch division of Funding 
Circle and Adyen. Both companies are much larger than Jungo and therefore probably more 
experienced as well as wealthy enough to hire experts on regulatory issues.  
Arner et al., advise a ‘wait and see approach’ when it comes to market intervention, 
first let the market settle (2015). Timing this right is very important because the regulator 
does not want to slow innovation by intervening too early but also not too late, leading to 
risks for consumers and possibly our economy. The nature of AFM’s attitude is reactive; 
being pro-active as a regulator is difficult because regulation emerges as a consequence and 
response to innovation from the industry and the AFM cannot forecast these developments 
(AFM employee, 2016). This approach, together with initiatives where companies can road 
test ideas seem to have similarities with the suggested ‘wait and see approach’.  
 In order to keep consumers’ and investors’ trust and on the other hand not distort 
innovation, theory suggests creating dynamic principle-based regulation for the FinTech 
industry (Vermeulen et al., 2016). The AFM is showing some flexibility in interpreting the 
law. When a company with a ‘new’ type of product consults about the possibilities of going 
into business and the idea wrings with the law, the AFM can review if there are possibilities 
for different interpretations of the law (AFM employee, 2016). Further companies can 
experiment with their product in the ‘sandbox’ in the near future. An employee of the AFM 
explains that this is a trend within AFM, DNB as well as ACM to look at the principles of the 
law rather than formal interpretations (AFM employee, 2016). Holland FinTech shares their 
opinion in their research that the Dutch regulation and legal framework is too rigid (Holland 
FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016). The current regulations and legal framework do no cater to 
various new FinTech applications and lack clarity, and as a result the strictness of regulation 
makes the Netherlands less attractive to FinTech (Holland FinTech & Roland Berger, 2016). 
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Hoogland from Jungo had some difficulties with the AFM because what his company does is 
completely new so there exists no regulation yet: ‘’The AFM researches if your business 
model fits in existing regulation, if not, it’s a no. Sometimes this comes across as very rigid’’ 
(Hoogland, 2016). He understands their differences to some extent because the AFM is in 
their role as supervisor, but Jungo wants to move on with their products and likes to be 
supported from a regulatory perspective as well (Hoogland, 2016). The most positive 
assessment came from Broekema of Funding Circle saying that current regulation is: ‘’good 
and proportionate, larger problems are being dealt with and on the other side there is not too 
much complex regulation that could kill the industry’’ (Broekema, 2016). A big difference 
between Jungo and Funding Circle in this case is the amount of experience both companies 
have. Funding Circle originated in 2009 while Jungo’s product went live only a few months 
ago. The experience and size of Funding Circle gives them an advantage in dealing with 
regulatory compliance, knowing the business and regulation well and having the manpower to 
comply more easily.  
 According to Vermeulen et al., knowing what, when and how regulations should be 
structured when constant, complex and disruptive technological innovations are happening is 
difficult (2016). In the Netherlands, the AFM waited quite a while with creating specific 
regulations for the FinTech industry. Companies had to deal with semi-constructions for a 
while; examples are interim authorization and permission. The AFM definitely took its time 
for the market to ‘settle’. How FinTech is regulated is starting to look similar to the UK. 
There is a shift from classical rules-based regulation to more principle-based regulation.  
 The reason for the differences between the UK and the Netherlands in the way they 
regulate the industry is threefold. First of all the UK has a long history of being the financial 
centre of Europe and one of the main financial centres in the world. They wanted to be on the 
forefront of regulation to maintain their position as a financial centre and to actively attract 
new business. (Woolward, 2016). By contrast, the Netherlands is not particularly known as 
Europe’s financial centre, although it is getting more attention nowadays. For this reason it 
might not have been the government’s main priority and therefore chose more of a ‘wait and 
see approach’. 
 Second, unlike the AFM, one of the tasks of the FCA is to promote effective 
competition in the industry (AFM employee, 2016). The emergence of this new industry was 
seen as a chance to promote competition, creating a better financial industry for end 
consumers. Especially after GFC this was seen as very important. Welcoming this new 
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industry and regulating them proportionally (instead of exactly the same as the large financial 
institutions) enhances competition in the market. 
 Third, the rights of the AFM and FCA differ. To start a policy process, either a 
revision or complete new policy or law, the AFM has to initiate this process through the 
Ministry of Finance. This can be very time consuming and the AFM cannot respond to 
developments in the industry as fast as they would like sometimes (AFM employee, 2016). 
The FCA on the other hand has the power to create new policy and laws, which leads to them 
being able to respond to industry developments much quicker (AFM employee, 2016). This 
may also be one of the reasons why they are at the forefront of regulating the FinTech 
industry.  
 As for the difference in stakeholder influence, it seems the AFM is easier to approach 
than its UK counterpart. Companies claimed to have been invited personally more often and 
meet with the regulator on a regular basis during events etcetera. This might have to do with 
the size of the industry in both countries. Ratesetter, Zopa and Funding Circle (the three peer-
to-peer lenders) joined forces to lobby for full authorization of their companies. This seems 
odd because you would expect companies wanting to be subject to less strict regulation. 
However, these companies wanted to be fully authorized to gain investor’s and the industry’s 
trust (O’Mahony, 2016). 
 Rapidly changing technology can affect the regulatory environment in two ways: first 
of all, most knowledge about new technologies and products is with the industry. Before 
government agencies have figured out what a new technology encompasses and what the 
effects on society are they are already some steps behind. This knowledge-gap makes creating 
effective regulation very difficult for regulators. Further, rapid changes in the industry make 
rule-based classical regulation almost impossible because there is no room for interpretation. 
Principle-based regulation that works more from the spirit of the law rather than clear 
sanction backed standards, seems to fit a rapid changing industry better.  
 Strict rules do not seem to be the answer for this industry and stakeholders get a lot of 
chances to collaborate or at least share their opinion with the regulator about the way they 
want to be regulated. A few peer-to-peer lenders in the UK even choose to be regulated with 
the reasoning that they wanted the label to receive investors’ confidence. Does the influence 
of these companies make government regulation meaningless? A possibility would be to leave 
regulation to the industry itself, since that is where the expertise is in any case. The major risk 
is that the industry could act only out of self-interest and leave the risks for our economy and 
consumers aside. However, this is desired neither by regulators nor by the industry itself. The 
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regulators are responsible for ensuring that the industry does not do damage to the economy 
and society at large. The industry is dependent on investor and consumer trust. Although in 
some industries, self-regulation might work, the financial industry has too much of a societal 
responsibility. If companies would choose to act only out of self-interest and, for example, 
lower the minimum requirements for mortgages major damage could be done to the economy 
and consumers. Because of this, an independent organization for oversight is necessary. At 
the same time, collaboration and knowledge sharing between regulator and regulatee remain 
important for the regulator to be informed enough to regulate properly and the industry being 
informed so they are able to be compliant.  
 Regulatory approaches in both countries have been heavily affected by the GFC. 
Distrust by consumers led the way for FinTech to emerge after the GFC. Regulators wanted to 
promote effective competition (which the FCA mentions explicitly) and choose a welcoming 
approach. These circumstances gave the FinTech industry momentum  to grow as quickly as 
they did over the past years.  
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis concentrates on stakeholder influence in the FinTech industry and the response of 
the regulators on the emergence of FinTech. It then explained the amount of influence 
FinTech companies have and how the regulators in botch cases choose to approach the 
regulation of the industry. Two cases have been selected for this research: the UK and Dutch 
FinTech market and regulator. Empirical evidence was collected by doing original interviews 
with companies from the industry and with the regulator, other evidence consisted of policy 
documents, government websites and academic articles. Reviewing the interviews and other 
documents I found that there exist strong relationships between the regulator and regulatee. 
Companies are often consulted, invited to formal and informal meetings and have their own 
case manager within the regulatory office. The UK set the example by moving from a more 
classical regulatory style towards a principle-based one, and the Netherlands followed shortly 
afterwards.  These findings support the theory a flexible principle-based legal framework suits 
a new and rapid changing industry better than rule-based regulation. 
 Despite the limitations of this thesis (ongoing changes in existing regulation and 
regulation being on the influence of many more influence than regulator and regulate), 
research on the UK case has shown that there is a pretty strong relationship between FinTech 
companies and the FCA. Companies are, for instance, provided with a dedicated contact 
within the FCA that helps them understand the regulatory framework. Academics have argued 
that the industries’ ability to influence has become more of an uphill battle than before GFC 
(Young, 2013). This might be true for the ‘traditional’ financial industry but FinTechs’ 
lobbying tools do not seem negatively affected – on the contrary. One reason is that the 
FCA’s responsibilities include creating more effective competition in the retail banking 
market, which is dominated by a few large companies. Because of the advantages for 
consumers, the market and attracting business to the UK, they encourage and welcome new 
businesses with open arms. Thus the FCA looks for ways to include the industry in shaping 
regulation through such arrangements as: stakeholder events, innovation hubs to accelerate 
growth, sandboxes to road test ideas and room for consultations. There also exists a great 
interdependency between the regulator and regulatee. Expert knowledge on developments in 
the industry is traded as a ‘good’ for influence on policymaking and helps with understanding 
regulations that companies have to comply with. Sufficient congruence between both players’ 
preferences allows this to be able. These developments are in line with the regulatory trends 
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of regulation shifting towards more collaborative forms of regulation (Lodge & Wegrich, 
2012). 
 Ratesetter and Funding Circle, two of the companies studied for this thesis, were both 
well aware of their regulatory obligations. This contrasts to the theory of Arner et al., which 
suggests that FinTechs’ often lack the necessary compliance culture because their origin is 
mostly technological instead of experts coming from the financial industry (2015). A factor 
that could explain this is the size of these companies (300+ employees); small companies in a 
more early stage of development might lack the resources to comply with regulation. 
Initiatives like ‘sandboxes’ and innovation hubs are meant for these smaller companies to 
receive guidance on regulation. Both companies indicated that early stage companies are 
being regulated differently when they are in one of the accelerator projects. At first regulation 
is flexible and principle based, but when the company matures, regulation changes more 
towards rule-based. 
 Dutch regulators also tried to include FinTech companies as they devise new rules. 
Many examples have been shared by the interviewees such as, stakeholder meetings (formal 
and informal) and other events where companies had the chance to share their opinion on 
current regulation. There seems to be quite extensive collaboration between the regulator and 
industry. The argument that lobbying tools of the financial industry have been affected after 
GFC does not apply to the Dutch FinTech industry. An employee of the AFM explained they 
want to be a responsive government body and easy to approach (AFM employee, 2016).  
There is however some disagreement between the different Dutch FinTech companies on 
whether the AFM actually listens to policy remarks. Opinions varied rather strongly among 
them: from a very positive understanding between the regulator and regulatee to a different 
view that the AFM is not as welcoming to newcomers as they project (Broekema, 2016; 
Hoogland, 2016). Broekema of Funding Circle explained the AFM is being as responsive as 
they are right now to enhance competition. Both regulator and FinTech companies see 
themselves as aligned in a struggle to limit the influence of the larger banks and challenge 
their market share (Broekema, 2016). 
 Nevertheless, most rules and regulations in the Netherlands seem to be command and 
control and strict rules backed by sanctions. At the same time, there appears to be a growing 
awareness among regulators that a new approach is needed. This can be extracted from the 
many initiatives of the AFM and DNB, most of them copied of the FCA. These initiatives 
include: regulatory sandbox, innovation hub, and many events, which are organized to gather 
input from the industry. 
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 The nature of AFM’s attitude has been reactive, because, as they claim, being pro-
active as a regulator is difficult because regulation emerges as a consequence and response to 
innovation from the industry and the AFM cannot forecast these developments. This approach 
together with initiatives where companies can road-test their ideas seem to have similarities 
with the suggested ‘wait and see approach’ by Arner et al. (2015). 
 When interpreting the law, the AFM is beginning to show some flexibility. If a new 
idea of a FinTech company wrings with the law, there are ways for the AFM to review and 
possibly change or interpret the law. This shows something, which looks like a principle-
based approach of regulation, which is also explained by an employee of the AFM that this 
approach is a trend within AFM as well as DNB and the ACM (AFM employee, 2016). 
 There are three main reasons for the differences in how both countries approach 
regulation. First of all, the UK has been a major financial center in Europe for a long time and 
wanted to be on the forefront to attract business. Second, one of the tasks of the FCA is to 
promote effective competition; this is not the case in the Netherlands. The emergence of 
FinTech was a chance for the FCA to possibly create a better more competitive market for 
consumers. As for the difference in stakeholder influence, the AFM seems easier to approach. 
This can be explained by the size of the industry, with the Netherlands having a much smaller 
market with fewer FinTech companies.  
 The biggest challenge for both regulators going forward is to keep up with this rapid 
changing technology. Working together with the industry to understand developments and 
their technology is therefore inevitable since expertise is on their side; it only makes sense to 
include them. If the Netherlands, in particular, wants to obtain a strong position as a center for 
financial innovation, it needs to be welcoming and responsive to new businesses. In the light 
of Brexit coming up and rumors of financial businesses seeking to move to other cities in 
Europe, a flexible legal framework is necessary to stay attractive for the FinTech industry. On 
the other hand regulation is not only about competing for new business. Regulators need to 
stay aware of the possible risks that come from new technologies within the industry in order 
to maintain a sustainable and safe market for consumers and the economy as a whole.  
 The major impact the GFC had on the emergence of FinTech and the regulatory 
approach can’t be overseen in this research. Momentum was created for FinTech to emerge 
because of a growing distrust by consumers of the ‘traditional’ financial industry. Regulators 
on the other hand, saw momentum to enhance effective competition by approaching the 
market in a way that would encourage more companies to enter the market.  
	 60	
Regulators need to know what, when and how they are regulating this industry. Trends 
within regulatory research on moving towards a principle-based approach seem fit for this 
industry. Many of the interviewees feel a flexible legal framework is necessary for young 
FinTech companies to be able to comply with regulation and keep their growth potential. 
Recent regulatory initiatives in the UK are received well by the industry and create an 
atmosphere for FinTech’s where they are able to road test their ideas without too much of a 
regulatory burden. The Netherlands has set sail in the same direction and learns from the UK 
initiatives. If the Netherlands wants to be at the forefront of an innovative financial industry it 
needs to step up its game and create the best possible legal framework with room for 
experimentation, of course balancing industry needs and possible risks that come from their 
activities.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1 
Letter to interviewees 
         12th of December 2016
  
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Hereby I would like to invite you to participate in a research study on the regulation of 
FinTech industries. For my thesis project for Leiden University, I will interview several 
people from different organisations within the financial industry, such as: banks, regulators 
and FinTech companies in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
The thesis is written for the master program of Public Administration, track: Governing 
Markets. Dr. J. Christensen supervises my thesis. 
The interview will mainly be about the following topics: influence of financial industry on 
regulation, vision on how FinTech is being regulated and ways to improve existing regulation.  
Preferably interviews will not be anonymized, this might be possible in concert. The 
interview will take approximately 45 minutes and will be conducted in person or over the 
phone. The interview will be recorded in order to be transcribed later on.  
 
If you have any additional questions regarding the interview, please do not hesitate to ask. 
 
I am looking forward to meeting you. 
 
Kind regards, 
Lourens Ruigrok 
+31 (0)646959759 
l.w.ruigrok@umail.leidenuniv.nl 
Leiden University (Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs) 
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Appendix 2 
Sample questions interview 
 
General questions - What organisation do you work for? What is their main goal/business? - What is the business model of the organisation you work for? - What is your role within the organisation? - How long have you been working with the company/organisation? - In which countries is your organisation active? - What part of your company’s employees is employed to work specifically on laws and 
regulation? (think about legal teams, compliance, regulatory affairs etc.) 
Financial regulation - Which financial authority holds supervision on your company/organisation? - Does your company have a banking license or another license from this authority? - How did the process of getting a banking (any other license, payment service 
providers etc) license go? (was it difficult, easy, almost impossible to comply with the 
rules and regulation) - What is your company’s general vision on current regulation in the UK/NL? - Has your company experienced any disputes with the regulatory authorities? - What do you consider to be the risks for consumers and our economy associated with 
the business of your company? 
Lobbying/co-regulation - Does your company ever replies to the possibility of consultations with the 
authorities? - Was your company ever invited to stakeholder meetings by the regulatory authority? - Is your business part of a stakeholder group? For instance UK or Holland FinTech - Did your company take any action to change existing regulation or avoid new 
regulation to be installed? - Do you feel the larger financial institutions, such as banks, try to install stricter 
regulation on fintech’s? - How is your relationship with traditional financial institutions? Did they invest in your 
company for example 
